Working Paper No. 115
(March 2009) The Rebirth of Minjian
Waijiao:
China’s Popular Diplomacy toward
Japan
by James Reilly
The term “popular diplomacy” [minjian waijiao, 民間外交]
was first used in China-Japan relations to describe
the informal interactions between government officials
before China and Japan normalized relations in 1972. The term resurfaced
in China to capture the wave of popular activism toward Japan from
2002 through 2005.[1] This wave of popular diplomacy demonstrates how
even in an authoritarian state, non-state actors can affect the international
environment and influence foreign policy decisions.
During the Maoist era, Chinese leaders enjoyed wide
latitude in making foreign policy. They pursued diplomatic relations
with Japan while maintaining a drumbeat of propaganda on Japanese wartime
atrocities and Communist-led resistance. In 1978, the onset of the
reform era began to transform state-society relations in China. By
the late 1990s, the spread of information technology, a market-oriented
media sector, and a vibrant market economy created an opening for China’s “history
activism” to
emerge.[2] Chinese activists
capitalized on the state’s nationalist rhetoric toward the wartime
past by insisting on a full accounting for Japan’s wartime atrocities,
compensation for Chinese victims, and a robust defense of China’s
sovereignty claims on disputed island territories. The contradictions
between China’s pragmatic foreign policy toward Japan and pervasive
anti-Japanese sentiments at home slowly began to emerge.
In 2002, public animosity toward Japan exploded in a wave of popular nationalism in China. Widespread coverage on the Chinese internet and in market-savvy newspapers catapulted individual activists to national prominence and quickly spread the protests around China. The Chinese government initially tolerated sporadic activism for diplomatic leverage and as a pressure valve to release popular emotions, yet protests soon began to inject contentious issues into bilateral relations, constrain Chinese policy toward Japan, and exacerbate a spiraling bilateral conflict. In spring 2005, widening unrest began to threaten domestic stability and undermine China’s broader strategic objectives. In response, Chinese leaders moved decisively to restrain domestic media and activists, and improve diplomatic relations with Japan. By 2006, China’s wave of popular diplomacy had come to an end.
I will begin by looking at the Chinese state’s manipulation of public images of Japan and the wartime past and how this created an opening for a wave of popular activism to emerge on Japan-related issues. Next I will focus on the emergence and impact of two groups of Chinese activists: the ‘redress movement’ and the ‘baodiao’ (Protect Diaoyu Islands) campaign. The final section captures the end of the wave of popular mobilization and suggests implications for the public diplomacy concept and for China-Japan relations.
Using the Past to Serve the Present
Since its earliest days, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) has linked its nationalist credentials to the
War of Resistance to Japan (1937-45). The CCP gained popular support
by promoting Communist leadership of anti-Japanese resistance, eventually
riding the mass movement of “peasant nationalism” to
victory in the civil war against the Nationalists.[3] After
1949, Party propaganda relived this historic victory
endlessly in public memorials, academic research,
and propaganda campaigns.[4] Even
China’s national anthem was an anti-Japanese fight song
composed during a 1934 battle. Yet Chinese leaders
were always careful to avoid allowing the wartime past to obstruct
their foreign policy objectives. As Premier Zhou Enlai told visiting
Japanese Diet members in 1954: The history of the past sixty years of Sino-Japanese relations
was not good. However, it is a thing of the past, and we must turn
it into a thing of the past. This is because friendship exists between
the peoples of China and Japan. Compared to the history of a few thousand
years, the history of sixty years is not worth bringing up. Our times
have been unfortunate, because we have only been living in these sixty
years. However, our ancestors weren’t like this. Moreover, we
cannot let such history influence our children and grandchildren.[5]
Following the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, Beijing’s
desire for Japan to help it balance against the Soviet
Union also took precedence over raising historical
issues, even leading Chinese leaders to welcome a
Japanese military buildup.[6] In
order to gain Japanese diplomatic recognition in
1972, Chinese leaders agreed to forgo demands for
reparations. The normalization of relations ushered
in a decade-long honeymoon in China-Japan relations during which discussion
of Japanese wartime atrocities in China was suppressed as “harmful
to the Sino-Japanese friendship.” State
propaganda distinguished between “the small handful of Japanese
militarists” responsible for the war, and ordinary Japanese people,
who were treated as victims of the militarists. Filmmakers
were urged to avoid depiction of Chinese wartime
suffering that would “dilute
our hatred of imperialism” and “lower our morale.”[7] Historian
Daqing Yang describes a “virtual absence of public commemoration
of the Nanjing Massacre before 1982,” noting that scholars who
tried to investigate the massacre were criticized
for “stirring
up national hatred and revenge.”[8]
China’s benevolent amnesia toward Japan began to erode in the
early 1980s. Chinese anxieties about the Soviet threat
were replaced by concerns over Japan’s expanding military capacity,
wealth, and close military alliance with the US. Chinese analysts began
to argue that Japan’s
unwillingness to satisfactorily address its wartime
aggression rendered Japan a potential threat likely
to repeat its aggression toward China.[9] Such
criticism of Japan also was useful in demanding greater
Japanese economic assistance. By the mid-1980s, Deng
Xiaoping began to remind visiting Japanese delegations that “Japan
is the country most indebted to China,” insisting that “If
we want to settle the historical account; Japan owes China the largest
debt.”[10]
The early 1980s also marked the onset of China’s promotion of “patriotic
education” as
part of a shift away from the divisive radicalism
of the Maoist era.[11] After
the suppression of the 1989 student movement, promoting
patriotism took on new urgency. The patriotic education
campaign featured a renewed emphasis on Chinese wartime
suffering at the hands of Japanese invaders as part
of a revamped “victimization
narrative.”[12] Revised
history textbooks, government-sponsored films, and
new history museums in Nanjing, Shenyang, and Beijing
re-framed the history of Japan’s
invasion to build popular support for national unity,
the Party, and its modernization drive.[13] As
a prominent statement at the September 18 History
Museum in Shenyang declares, “China
must increase its national strength to avoid the
backwardness which leads to bullying and humiliation.” The museum
urges visitors to “increase
[their] patriotic spirit” and warns them to “not forget
China’s national shame and work to reinvigorate China.”[14]
China’s legacy of manipulating history in the service of the
state is hardly uncommon—as Ernst Renan writes, “Getting
its history wrong is part of being a nation.”[15] However,
decades of manipulation of the past made it impossible to openly and
honestly commemorate the Chinese people’s tragic suffering while
allowing Japanese conservatives to avoid a complete accounting for
Japan’s wartime actions in China. The contradictions between
anti-Japanese propaganda at home and a pragmatic approach to Japan
abroad remained tenable only so long as Chinese society was quiescent
and the state controlled all mass communication. By the 1990s, rapid
economic growth, expanded social autonomy, and the spread of the internet
and a market-oriented media sector provided resources for Chinese activists
to begin to challenge the state’s opportunistic approach toward
Japan and the wartime past.
China's Redress Movement
China’s ‘redress movement’ [索賠運動, suopei
yundong]
refers to the pursuit of lawsuits in the Japanese
court system since the early 1990s on issues such
as the ‘comfort
women,’ forced
laborers, biological warfare, and chemical weapons
left behind in China. The redress movement emerged
in the mid-1990s as wartime victims aided by Japanese lawyers began
to file lawsuits in Japan demanding financial compensation. Japanese
courts dismissed most cases by citing the statute of limitations in
Japan’s civil
code as well as diplomatic instruments ending the
war and establishing diplomatic relations with China.[16] Despite
these legal setbacks, the redress movement has grown
through activists’ ability
to link Chinese victims and their communities with
Japanese lawyers while garnering publicity in Chinese
media.
The most prominent of these ‘history activists’ is Wang
Xuan, a former middle-school teacher who was living
in Japan in 1995 when she heard that people from her hometown in Zhejiang
province were beginning a lawsuit over Japan’s
biological warfare. It immediately struck home. Her
uncle had died from Japanese biological warfare,
and her father suffered from lifelong poor heath due to Japanese biological
weapons. With her unique combination of Japanese language skills, local
support, and personal dedication, Wang Xuan soon became the official
representative of several Chinese plaintiffs groups. Wang Xuan and
other activists brought Chinese lawyers and academics into the redress
movement to provide legal expertise and field research.[17] The
media also helped: a local paper in Jiangxi province
ran a series of stories on Japan’s wartime biological warfare
in the area and then helped process the hundreds
of resulting claims from former victims.[18]
Chinese media quickly embraced the redress movement
as a unique opportunity to tell poignant personal
stories within the context of a compelling foreign
policy issue. In 2002 Wang Xuan was selected as one
of the few individuals who “inspires
China” [感動中國, gandong
zhongguo] by Central China TV (CCTV), and given the
opportunity to make an acceptance speech on national
television. She was also selected by the readers
of China’s premier
weekly paper, Southern Weekend, as the “Person of the
Year” for
2002, and began to write a weekly column for the
paper.[19] National media
attention soon translated into widespread local recognition:
when Wang Xuan visited Dalian in 2003, the city opened
the “first-ever
national Wang Xuan hotline for biological warfare
documentation.”[20]
Publicity over the lawsuits captured the imagination
of affected communities all over China and expanded
networks of support. In 1996, residents of Changde
city formed a support group for a biological warfare
lawsuit and organized petition campaigns, held academic conferences,
and produced a documentary movie. Most of the group’s
public events were staged at a local memorial commemorating
military resistance, an example of how the redress
movement appropriated official monuments for local
purposes.[21] The
national support group for biological warfare lawsuits – including
Chinese lawyers, activists, and local officials – coordinated
to issued publications, organized symposia and advocacy
events, and hosted photo exhibitions in China, Japan,
and the United States.[22] Chinese
plaintiffs also filed suits in the United States,
the International Court of Justice, and Chinese courts.[23] Repeated
rejection of the lawsuits in Japan seemed only to
strengthen the determination of the Chinese plaintiffs. As one 71-year-old
woman told a reporter after a 2005 legal setback, “even if I
cannot win this lawsuit, my grandson will win it.”[24]
Through their advocacy, Chinese history activists have become integrated
into a transnational social movement dedicated all
victims of Japanese wartime atrocities.[25] Many
news stories on the redress movement praise their
close cooperation with Japanese supporters.[26] In
their public statements, history activists refer
to universal norms such as historical truth and justice.
As Wang Xuan explains, “This work is not aimed at
the past aggressors but at their successors. We carefully
choose our methods in order not to increase hatred,
but instead to deepen understanding and dialogue.”[27] She
calls for Japan, the US, and China to jointly establish
a “Peace
Fund” that
would support joint academic research, preserve the
historical record of Chinese suffering and build
memorials to Chinese victims, de-classify and publish
historical documents, and provide medical assistance and financial
support for Chinese victims.[28]
Caroline Rose suggests that such “agents of remembrance” are
supporting an “interactive process between perpetrators and victims
at the grassroots level” that
contributes to reconciliation between China and Japan.[29] Popular
involvement in historical issues has even contributed
to a more critical view of controversial periods
in China’s own
modern past.[30] Yet despite
the noble intent of many history activists, their
highlighting of Japanese wartime atrocities likely
contributed to the wave of popular protests in China from 2002 through
2005. One such example was the campaign for compensation when, on August
4, 2003, abandoned Japanese chemical weapons (ACW) accidentally poisoned
37 people and killed one.
A Poisonous Legacy: Japan’s Abandoned Chemical Weapons
After World War II, Japanese units in China disposed of vast amounts
of chemical weapons and agents by such crude methods
as burial, dumping them in rivers, or mixing them
in with ordinary weapons. The bulk of the known weapons
were later buried in Jilin province by Chinese forces. China estimates
that a total of 2 million weapons still exist in China while Japan
estimates some 700,000.[31] For
decades, the Chinese government essentially ignored
the ACW issue, leaving localities to manage the problem
on their own.[32] In
1996, Chinese leaders began to raise the issue with
Japanese leaders in preparation for ratifying the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). On July 30, 1999, Japan formally
undertook responsibility for the cleanup and destruction of ACW in
China as part of its obligations under the CWC.[33]
From 1999-2003, Chinese official state-run media,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, and China’s Defense
White Papers all presented Japan’s
management of the cleanup process in a favorable
light.[34] The
Chinese government never insisted on compensation
or apologies for individual victims of ACW, even
when the accidental exposure of ACW in China led
to injuries and deaths of Chinese citizens, such as in August 2001.[35] Indeed,
before August 2003 the ACW cleanup and destruction
process seemed to be one of the few bright spots in the increasingly
contentious China-Japan relationship.
The compensation issue suddenly exploded into popular
consciousness on August 4, 2003 when Chinese construction
workers unwittingly unearthed Japanese weapons with
chemicals in Qiqihair (Helongjiang Province), poisoning
37 people and eventually killing one. The Japanese government quickly
sent a team to the area, confirmed that weapons were indeed Japanese
ACW, and issued a statement of “extreme
regret.”[36] China initially
responded calmly. The Foreign Ministry quietly requested
that Japan pay for cleanup expenses, medical treatment
and disability payments for victims, and costs resulting
from suspending construction work in the area.[37] Chinese
Foreign Vice-Minister Wang Yi praised Japan for demonstrating “that
it attaches importance to this serious incident and
will deal with it properly and with sincerity.”[38] Foreign
Minister Li Zhaoxing, then visiting Japan, refrained
from raising the incident in his meeting with Prime
Minister Koizumi, as did President Hu Jintao when
he met visiting Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo on August
10. Only Wu Bangguo, chairman of the National People’s
Congress, raised the issue briefly in his meeting
with Fukuda, describing the ACW issue as “a sensitive issue for
the Chinese people.”[39]
China’s official media were similarly restrained. On August 15,
the anniversary of the end of WWII, Xinhua stated
that, “With
the arrival of the news that the Japanese side has
admitted that the barrels of toxic material hurting
people in Qiqihar are part of the chemical weapons left by Japan, victims
of the 4 August incident are now able to breathe a sigh of relief.”[40] Liaowang,
a prominent Party-run news magazine, ran articles
by leading Japan scholars in China praising Japan’s management
of the issue and urging continued dialogue.[41] Indeed,
before August 15 there was little indication that
there would be much difficulty in quickly and quietly resolving the
dispute in a fashion similar to previous ACW incidents.
Public Pressure Mounts from August 15 to September 18
On August 15, 2003, Chinese activists began an online
petition campaign demanding that Japan apologize
and offer compensation for the victims of the Qiqihair
incident. On September 18 (the anniversary of Japan’s invasion
of northeastern China in 1931), website organizers
sought to deliver one million signatures to the Japanese
embassy. The online campaign was augmented by public
sign-on events around China, garnering support from fiery editorials
in some of China’s
most prominent activist newspapers. The Beijing
Youth Daily declared that “condolences
cannot take the place of compensation.”[42] After
one of the victims died from his injuries on August
21, the movement to boycott Japanese goods [抵制日貨, dizhi rihuo]
spread rapidly across the Chinese internet, urged on by
postings describing Japanese people as “little
bandits” and
urging Japan to “pay off its bloody debts.”[43]
In response to public pressure, Chinese official
rhetoric grew more critical and assertive. On August
22, Foreign Vice-Minister Wang Yi told the Japanese
ambassador that the Chinese people have every right
to be indignant and urged Japan to “take substantial action
to shoulder its due responsibility for the loss of
the victims and the local people and to give due
explanation.”[44] Former
Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, now a State Counselor,
and Zeng Qinghong, a member of the Politburo Standing
Committee, also urged Japan to take a responsible
attitude toward the issue and speed up its destruction
of the ACW, expressing their “hope” [希望, xiwang]
that Japan would resolve the issue quickly and reasonably.[45]
Seeking to resolve the situation, Japanese officials
quietly offered their largest-ever single payment
to Chinese ACW victims, 100 million yen (US $856,000). In line with
Japan’s practice
since 1999, the funds would be labeled “sympathy funds,” drawn
from Japan’s
ACW cleanup budget. The Japanese offer was certainly
sufficient to meet the initial Chinese demands and
normally would have resolved the dispute.[46] However,
on September 2, the Japanese offer was revealed by
Japan’s Mainichi
Shinbum and immediately posted on the Chinese internet.
Chinese activists decided to deliver the online petition letter, then
signed by over 300,000 people, to the Japanese embassy in Beijing in
advance of bilateral talks on September 4-5. They hoped to “put
pressure on the Japanese government” and “support” Chinese
negotiators; yet activists’ demands went far beyond, and in places
contradicted, established Chinese government policy.[47]
As negotiations stagnated, public mobilization quickly
mounted. The popular paper Global Times strongly
criticized Japan for not declaring its funds “compensation.” Chinese
lawyers representing the family of the man who had
died from the Qiqihair incident publicly demanded
US$2.7 million in compensation.[48] Beijing
Youth News endorsed this demand, warning that the
experience of Chinese compensation lawsuits in Japan “teaches
us that in the difficult road ahead of us, we must
steadfastly ‘fight’ ever
onward.”[49] The
online petition was completed on September 18 and
delivered to the Japanese embassy with the names
and addresses of 1.2 million signatories.[50] Public
opinion polls at the time demonstrated broad support
for the activists’ demands.[51] Anti-Japanese
sentiments received another boost over reports of
a September 16-18 sex scandal that reportedly involved
380 male Japanese tourists and 500 Chinese prostitutes.[52] On
September 18, the South China Morning Post, an independent
Hong Kong paper, ran an article arguing that “Chinese
leaders must take seriously the people who have signed
the online campaign and registered their grievances
with Japan.”[53]
China’s negotiating posture soon became more assertive, reflecting
this public pressure. On October 3, Chinese Foreign
Minister Li Zhaoxing issued China’s first strong public “demand” [要求,
yaoqiu] to
the Japanese ambassador to China, Anami Koreshige,
noting that the incident “has touched off strong dissatisfaction
of the Chinese public as well as the victims.” Four days later,
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao told Prime Minister Koizumi
at a meeting in Bali that the most pressing task
in bilateral relations was to resolve the issue,
pledging that “such
an effort will help remove the unpleasant feeling
in the hearts of the Chinese people.”[54]
On October 19, the two sides finally reached an agreement.
Japan promised to pay 300 million yen (US$2.75 million)
directly to the Chinese government to cover “costs in relation
to the disposal of abandoned chemical weapons,” which China pledged
to distribute in an “appropriate manner.” Japan requested
that the Chinese government explain that the funds
were not “compensation” for
victims; yet the Chinese Foreign Ministry quickly
pledged to use the money to “compensate” the
victims.[55] In his meeting
with Koizumi on October 20th, Hu Jintao stated, “The Japanese
side should take measures to quickly fulfill the
agreement and compensate the victims as early as
possible.”[56] After
this agreement, the Chinese government quickly resumed
its positive tone on Japan’s
ACW cleanup.[57] The two sides
quickly and quietly resolved subsequent incidents
of injuries resulting from ACW before the Chinese
public could get involved.[58]
Public pressure clearly influenced China’s official rhetoric,
negotiating strategy, and policy decisions in this case. Before 2003,
the Chinese government had never contested Japanese payment amounts
for victims, never demanded that funds be labeled “compensation,” and
had never negotiated on behalf of individual victims -- all policies
used from August to October 2003. Officials’ negotiating demands
and public rhetoric were moderate after the incident, growing more
assertive only as public mobilization mounted. The online protests
were initiated and sustained by individual activists. The key media
report sparking public mobilization came from a news source outside
China, and was spread rapidly through postings on the Chinese internet.
In contrast, China’s official media urged the public to remain
calm and praised Japan’s
response to the incident.[59] Chinese
rhetoric announcing the final agreement also indicated
officials’ sensitivity to the public’s demands for “compensation” from
Japan.
The Chinese government could have simply restrained
all protests and negative media coverage of the incident.
However such an action would have had high costs:
the Party would have appeared to be siding with Japan
against Chinese ACW victims. Instead, Chinese officials
likely calculated that tolerating initial displays
of public pressure would strengthen their negotiating
leverage with Japan.[60] This
decision provided an opening for public mobilization
to emerge and grow quickly, increasing the costs
of suppression. Trapped between Japanese intransigence
and mounting public pressure, Chinese leaders had little choice but
to take a highly public stance in demanding significant concessions
from Japan. One activist captured the government’s
predicament with a Chinese proverb: “having mounted the tiger,
it is difficult to dismount” (上虎難下, shanghu
nanxia).[61]
China's Baodiao Campaign
China’s baodiao [保釣, Protect the Diaoyu Islands] campaign
seeks to defend China’s territorial claims to the Diaoyu (Senkaku)
Islands, a clump of five islets and three barren
rocks 200 miles off the Chinese coast, northeast
of Taiwan. China, Japan, and Taiwan all claim the
islands based on history and geography.[62] Japan
first took control of the islands in 1895, and has
effectively controlled the islands since 1971. At
a 1972 banquet celebrating the normalization of relations, Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai announced: “There
is no need to mention the Diaoyu Islands. It does
not count as a problem of any sort compared to recovering
normal diplomatic relations.”[63] Since
1978, China has maintained that the two sides hold
different positions on the sovereignty of the islands,
which should be set aside as they pursue joint development
of natural resources in the area. Japan counters
that there is no dispute since Japan enjoys both
legal sovereignty and effective control over the
islands.
Chinese leaders have been satisfied to declare China’s dejure sovereignty over the islands while not actually challenging
Japan’s
defacto control, a policy praised by a leading PLA
scholar as “pragmatic.”[64] After
China’s 1992 Territorial Waters Law restated China’s claims
to the islands, Chinese President Jiang Zemin reaffirmed
China’s
willingness to “shelve” the dispute in favor of joint development
during a trip to Japan.[65] During
a 1996 dispute sparked by an attempt by Hong Kong
activists to land on the islands, Chinese leaders
again acted to constrain public sentiment while reassuring
Japan.[66] Since
1996, China has taken “every
measure possible to forestall further incidents from
breaking out over the disputed rocks.”[67]
China’s moderate policy is not without costs, both at home and
abroad. As China refrains from challenging Japan’s ‘effective
control’ over the islands, Japan’s claim becomes consolidated
through the legal principle of ‘acquisitive prescription.’[68] Moreover,
the Chinese government’s perceived inability to defend its claims
to the Diaoyu islands has generated popular criticism
of the leadership as weak, particularly in contrast to China’s
baodiao activists. Given that the baodiao movement
on Taiwan eventually developed into a mass movement
that undermined KMT authoritarian rule in the 1970s, Chinese officials
view baodiao activists
with apprehension.[69]
The baodiao campaign began as a Taiwanese-led movement
in the early 1970s and reached the mainland after
the 1996 protests in Hong Kong.[70] Tong
Zeng, a longtime history activist, emerged as its
unofficial leader after founding the “Protect Diaoyu Association.” In
1999, the Association made its first attempt to land
on the islands. Over the next few years, activists
established a company in Beijing, registered the baodiao association
in Hong Kong, engaged in publicity activities, gave media interviews,
applied to lease the islands for tourism, and called on the Chinese
government to issue a “Diaoyu” stamp,
as South Korea did for the Tokdo islands.[71]
In their public statements, baodiao activists proclaimed
their frustration with the Chinese government. “The central government’s
emphasis on ownership over the islands is not enough,” stated
Tong Zeng. “It should lobby other politicians, especially those
in the US, to make sure they at least have a clear
idea that the islands are disputed.”[72] Activist
Feng Jinhua, who was given a 10-month jail sentence
by a Japanese court in 2001 for painting slogans
outside the gate of the Yasukuni shrine, told reporters that “the
Chinese government must exercise real administration of the islands
in establishing its sovereignty claims.”[73] After
the government rejected their bid to develop the
islands for tourism, Zhang Likun, a former PLA soldier,
stated: “It’s
really nonsense. Why can’t
we develop our own territory?”[74]
A Brief Tempest: Chinese Activists’ 2004
Voyage to the Islands
PRC activists soon followed the example of Japanese,
Hong Kong, and Taiwanese activists by attempting
to land on the islands. From June 2003 to August
2004, mainland activists attempted four trips to
the islands, yet the first three times the Chinese
government notified the Japanese Coast Guard in advance, ensuring they
were turned back before reaching the islands.[75] In
their fourth attempt, on March 24, 2004, the baodiao activists managed to depart undetected and successfully
landed on the islands. They were arrested by the
Japanese Coast Guard on charges of violating immigration laws and taken
to Japan’s
southern Okinawa prefecture. According to Japanese
media reports, Foreign Vice-Minister Takeuchi Yukio instructed local
departments to “respond
following the law” and to “refrain
from actions taken out of consideration for China.”[76]
The activists immediately began a hunger strike,
demanding that they be permitted to sail their boat
back to China.[77]
Chinese Foreign Vice-Minister Zhang Yesui insisted
to the Japanese embassy in Beijing that “the Japanese side protect
their personal security, and immediately release
them without condition. Otherwise, the situation
will expand and grow more complicated, and certainly will arouse the
powerful indignation of the Chinese people.”[78] At
the same time, baodiao activists began a protest
outside the Japanese embassy, demanding the activists’ immediate
release and burning Japanese flags. Although a Chinese
foreign ministry spokesperson called the flag burning “extremist,” he
also defended protesters’ “rightful
use of their constitutional right to free speech.”[79]
The evening of March 25, Chinese Ambassador to Japan
Wu Dawei delivered a strong demand to Japanese Foreign
Ministry for the activists’ immediate release, referring to the
danger of Chinese public emotions if the situation
was allowed to continue.[80] The
combination of Wu’s
unexpected visit and the flag burning in Beijing
clearly shook Japanese officials. That evening, senior
Foreign Ministry officials decided to release the
seven Chinese activists the next day.[81]
In response, activist Lu Yunfei told reporters that “the incident
marks a big victory in China’s diplomacy towards Japan. Japan
sent them back without any conditions, just as we
demanded.”[82] Yet
the seven activists were immediately taken into custody
upon their return to China, denying them a public
reception in Shanghai or Beijing.[83]
The next day, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing called
Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko to express
China’s appreciation for
the prompt return of the activists and emphasized
the importance China places on good relations with
Japan.[84] Foreign Ministry
spokesperson Kong Quan reaffirmed that “We have an indisputable
claim to these islands,” but added that China hopes that “through
peaceful negotiation we can come to narrow some differences.”[85] Both
governments stopped subsequent attempts to sail to
the islands.[86]
The crisis evaporated almost as fast as it had emerged.
Although both sides cancelled bilateral talks on
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, on April
3 Premier Wen Jiabao met with Foreign Minister Kawaguchi
Yoriko to offer reassurances on China’s Diaoyu policy. The only
sign of the previous week’s
crisis was Foreign Vice-Minister Wang Yi’s
last-minute absence from a signing ceremony for Japanese
yen loans to China, a decision possibly influenced
by concerns on the propriety of publicly accepting
Japanese money only a week after Chinese citizens
were arrested by Japan for traveling to territory
claimed by China.[87]
On April 22, less than a month after the crisis,
bilateral talks on a mutual notification agreement
for the East China Sea resumed in Beijing.
Impact of the Diaoyu Landings
China’s longstanding Diaoyu policy has been to argue for the
shelving of sovereignty disputes while pursuing joint
development. The 2004 landing incident reversed these
priorities: compelling the Chinese government to
articulate its sovereignty claims over the Diaoyu
Islands, heightening Japanese anxiety over the sovereignty
issue, and undermining support within Japan for joint
exploration. As one Chinese scholar explained, “Those
activists brought the government into the issue as
it was the government who had to intervene after
the seven were arrested. It’s a disturbance
to China’s
diplomatic route of ‘peaceful rise’ [和平崛起, heping
jueqi].” [88]
The Chinese government did not instigate the incident;
instead it discouraged broader public involvement
and restrained domestic media coverage.[89] Chinese
leaders tolerated limited public protests as part
of a two-level game strategy, warning Japan that
public anger would grow rapidly if the activists
were not immediately released. By tolerating the
protests, Chinese leaders gave the impression that they could not compromise
due to domestic public opinion. This strategy worked only due to the
brevity of the incident. If Japan had refused to return the activists
quickly, it would have proven almost impossible to block the flow of
information from Hong Kong media to the Chinese public and the protests
would have grown rapidly.[90]
The March 2004 incident also exacerbated spiraling
tensions by forcing the Japanese government to strongly
assert its sovereignty claims. Japanese Diet members
quickly called for the government to “exercise extreme vigilance” on
the islands.[91] The
Japanese government soon announced that it would
renew Japanese citizens’ leases of the islands, which The
China Daily denounced as an “attempt by the Japanese to domestically
legalize their claim of sovereignty over the archipelago.”[92]
A month after the landing, Japanese right-wing activists
drove a van into China’s consulate in Osaka, sparking another
flag-burning protest at the Japanese embassy in Beijing.[93]
The next year, Japan took over control of a lighthouse
built by Japanese activists on the islands, which
Japan’s Coast
Guard pledged to defend against “illegal
incursions.”[94] The
Chinese Foreign Ministry denounced the move as “illegal and invalid,” and
Chinese activists vowed to return to destroy the
lighthouse.[95] As one
PLA scholar explained, after the 2004 landings, “the
strengthening of public opinion and popular nationalism
on both sides has worsened this issue, noticeably
increasing the difficulty for both governments to
control tensions.”[96]
Conclusion: The Wave Comes to an End
Protests during the Qiqihair incident and the Diaoyu
landing were part of a broad wave of popular mobilization
sweeping across China, culminating in the massive
online and street protests in spring 2005 challenging Japan’s
bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council. After putting
down the protests, Chinese leaders began to rein in activists
and prohibit sensationalist, negative media coverage
of Japan. In October 2006, Chinese leaders welcomed Abe Shinzo, the
new Japanese prime minister, in Beijing, marking the onset of warming
bilateral relations. By 2007, Chinese public opinion toward Japan began
to improve.[97]
The state’s success in constraining activism, shifting foreign policy, and improving public opinion of Japan underscores its continued strength vis-à-vis
Chinese society. Yet the protests set a worrisome
precedent. They erupted in reaction to events beyond the control of
the Chinese state, initially reported by foreign media and spread via
the internet in China. Working outside state structures, Chinese activists
built domestic and international networks of support; utilized popular
press and the internet to mobilize the public; and engaged in direct
action campaigns in China and overseas. Although most of these actions
required some level of acquiescence by the Chinese government, they
also altered the subsequent political environment facing Chinese leaders,
impacting bilateral relations and foreign policy decisions.
This case study also illuminates two types of interactive
dynamics among civil society actors. The redress
movement collaborated with like-minded counterparts
in Japan in pursuit of an accurate accounting of the wartime past and
historical justice for individual victims. Their approach is similar
to Chinese professors who have collaborated with Japanese and South
Korean academics to produce a joint history textbook.[98] Such
initiatives may contribute to eventual reconciliation
between China and Japan over the wartime past; yet they also contributed
to the wave of popular protests. Activism such as the Diaoyu landings
in 2004 worsened public opinion of Japan and sparked a conflict spiral
at both the state and societal levels. Chinese and Japanese leaders
had to take decisive measures to reverse the deepening crisis and stabilize
bilateral relations.
While impressive, the recent improvement in China-Japan
relations remains tenuous. As in the past, both governments
have preferred to downplay issues related to the wartime past rather
than directly address them. The warming of ties has been almost entirely
state-led and the improvement of public opinion remains fragile. In
this environment, an unexpected incident could spark another round
of diplomatic estrangement and societal acrimony. To consolidate the
gains of the past few years, Chinese leaders should encourage the resumption
of true ‘popular diplomacy’ through
direct, unfettered interactions between Chinese and
Japanese individuals and institutions.
JAMES REILLY is a Post-Doctoral Research Associate
with the China’s War with Japan Programme at the University of
Oxford.
ENDNOTES
1. For the pre-1972 use of this term, see: Shi Guifang, Zhanhou
zhongri guanxi (Postwar Chinese-Japanese Relations) (Beijing:
Dangdai Chubanshe, 2005), 36. For the more recent
usage, see: Wang Guoping, “Cong fandui ribe changren
kan minjian xingwei de zuoyong” (Understanding the
Role of Social Action from the Opposition to Japan's
Permanent Membership in UN Security Council) Huanqiu, April
16, 2005, 28-29. [Return
to Text]
2. James Reilly, “China's History Activism
and Sino-Japanese Relations,” China: An International Journal 4:2
(Fall 2006): 189-216. [Return
to Text]
3. Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1962). [Return
to Text]
4. Laura Hein and Mark Selden, “The Lessons of War,
Global Power, and Social Change,” in Censoring History: Citizenship
and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States, ed . Laura
Hein and Mark Selden (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,
2000): 49. [Return
to Text]
5. Quoted in: Daqing Yang, “Mirror for the Future
or the history card? Understanding the "history
problem",” in Chinese-Japanese Relations in
the Twenty-first Century, ed. Marie Söderberg
(London and New York: Routledge): 21. I will give
all Chinese and Japanese names with surname first. [Return
to Text]
6. Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “China's Japan
Policy in the 1980s,” International Affairs 61,
no. 1 (1984-85): 92. [Return
to Text]
7. Yinan He, “Remembering and Forgetting the
War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese
Relations, 1950–2006,” History and Memory (2007):
69. [Return
to Text]
8. Daqing Yang, “Convergence or Divergence?
Recent Historical Writings on the Rape of Nanjing,” The American
Historical Review 104:3
(June 1999): 858. [Return
to Text]
9. For example: Liu Jiangyong, “Riben meihua
qinlue lishi de dongxiang jiqi genyuan”
(What Lies Behind the Japanese Attempt to Adorn its Aggression
History (Xiandai
guoji guanxi )
(Contemporary International Relations) 9 (1996):
2-8. [Return
to Text]
10. The first comment was made in 1987; the
second in May 1989. Yang, “History Card,” 14; Yong Deng,
“Chinese Relations with Japan: Implications
for Asia-Pacific Regionalism,” Pacific Affairs 70:3
(Autumn 1997): 377. [Return
to Text]
11. Zhao Suisheng, “A State-led Nationalism:
The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen
China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31:
287-302. [Return
to Text]
12.Peter Hays Gries, China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics,
and Diplomacy (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2004): 69-86. [Return
to Text]
13. He, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 57-58. [Return
to Text]
14. Personal visits to Shenyang, Summer
2001. [Return
to Text]
15. Quoted in: E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism
Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990): 12. [Return
to Text]
16. Xu Jingbo and Hu Lingyuan, Zhanhou Riben de zhuyao
shehui sichao yu zhongri guanxi (Leading
Social Trends in Postwar Japan and China-Japan
Relations) (Shanghai: Shanghai Finance University
Press, 2003): 128-132. [Return
to Text]
17. Wang Xuan, “Xijunzhan fanzui lishi
nenggou yangai ma?” (Can
the War Crimes of Biological Warfare Be Covered Over By History),
in Riben jiaokeshu
wenti pingxi (Analysis
of the Japanese Textbook Problem), eds.
Zhang Haipeng, Bu Ping (Beijing: Chinese
Academy of Social Science Press, 2002):
304-5; Nan Xianghong, “Ta ba xijunzhan
zhenxiang gaosu shijie”
(She Told the Truth About the Biological
Warfare to the World) Nanfang
Zhoumou ( Southern
Weekend) September 12, 2002: A5. [Return
to Text]
18. Duan Bayi, “Jiangxi Meiti Jielou
qinhua rijun zai gan shiyong xijunzhan jiqi minfen”
(The Jiangxi Media Reveals That Invading
Japanese Armies used Biological Warfare
in Jiangxi, Arousing Popular Anger), March
5, 2003. [Return
to Text]
19. Nan Xianghong, “Jiyi bushi weile hen”
(Remembering is Not for Hatred: Person of
the Year, Wang Xuan) Nanfang Zhoumou (Southern
Weekend), December 26, 2002: A2. [Return
to Text]
20. Quanguo shoukai “xijunzhanzhengju”
wangxuan rixian (Opening of the first-ever national
“biological warfare documentation department”
Wang Xuan hotline) Dalian
Zaobao (Dalian
Morning News), May 15, 2003, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-05-15/0302124476s.shtml[Return
to Text]
21. “Shezhizu zhuhe qinhua junyiqi wuhuaxueqi
an yuangao shensu” (Film
Production Group Congratulates the Successful Lawsuit on
the Removal of Chemical Weapons,” http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-09-30/13401844324.shtml[Return
to Text]
22. Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations; Facing the
Past, Looking to the Future? (New
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005): 93. [Return
to Text]
23. The Chinese court found that according
to international law, it only has jurisdiction
for a suit against a natural person and
so rejected the lawsuit. “The
Crucial Case For Chinese Civil Lawsuits
For Compensation From Japan” (Zhongguo
minjian duiri supei de guanjian ge'an) Nanfang Zhoumou (Southern
Weekend) June 13, 2002, A10. [Return
to Text]
24. “Xijunzhan zhongguo shouhaizhe supeian
erjie jinri kaiting” (The
Second Round of Hearings on Chinese Biological Warfare Victims'
Lawsuit Opens Today), Xinhua, May 19, 2003. [Return
to Text]
25. Su Zhiliang, “2000 Nian dongjing
nuxing guoji zhanfan fating jishi”
(The Record of the 2000 Tokyo International Women's
War Crimes Tribunal) Kangri
Zhanzheng yanjiu (Journal
of Studies of China's War of Resistance
Against Japan) 39:1 (2001): 225-233. [Return
to Text]
26. Su Zhigang, “Dubian chunyi: fouren
Nanjing datusha, zhongguoren kending hui fennu”
(Dubian Chunyi: Denying the Nanjing Massacre
Will Certainly Outrage Chinese People) Nanfang Zhoumou
( Southern
Weekend), January 27, 2005: A3. [Return
to Text]
27. Tan Jin, “Duiri susongtuan tuanzhang
xiwang genduo de xuezhe diaocha 'siwang
gongchang'” (The Group Leader
of Legal Action against Japan Hopes More Scholars Will Investigate
the 'Factory of Death') Cankao
yu sisiang (Observing
and Reflecting), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-12-15/16592380370.shtml[Return
to Text]
28. Nan Xianghong. [Return
to Text]
29. Rose, 21-31. [Return
to Text]
30. Howard W. French, “Scenes from a Nightmare:
A Shrine to the Maoist Chaos,” The New York Times ,
May 29, 2005: A 3. [Return
to Text]
31. Lu Yi, Zhongri xianghu lijie haiyou douyuan? Guanyu
liangguo minzhong xianghu renshi de bijiao
yanjiu (How
Far Away Is Mutual Understanding Between
China and Japan? A Comparative Study on
the Mutual Perceptions Between the Two Peoples)
(Beijing, World Knowledge Press, 2006):
139. [Return
to Text]
32. See the case of Dunhua city, home to
90% of all known ACW in China, in: Su Zhiliang,
Rong Weimu, Chen Lizui, eds. Riben Qinhua Zhanzheng Yiliu
Wenti He Peichang Wenti (Problems
Left Over From Japan's War of Invasion of
China and the Compensation Issue) (Beijing:
Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2005): 669. [Return
to Text]
33. The document text is available (in Chinese)
at: http://www.sjhistory.org/site/newxh/yjzt8-4mb_a200504113155.htm[Return
to Text]
34. See: http://english.people.com.cn/features/ndpaper2002/app5.html ; http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2722/t15974.htm ;
“Japanese Team in China Retrieves Wartime
Chemical Weapons” Xinhua,
September 27, 2002. [Return
to Text]
35. “Second World War bomb explodes in China,
one dead,” Xinhua, August 30, 2001. The
incident was never mentioned by the Foreign
Ministry or when Vice-President Hu Jintao
met Morihiro Hosokawa, a former Japanese
Prime Minister. [Return
to Text]
36. Wu Xiaodong and Liang Dong, “A History
of Suffering, Real Choices: What Does the
'4 August' Incident of Injury from a
Chemical Agent Abandoned by the Japanese
Army Invading China Tell us?” Xinhua,
August 21, 2003. [Return
to Text]
37. Wu Xiaodong and Wang Qian, “Chinese
Breathing Sigh of Relief on Toxic Gas Incident,” Xinhua,
August 15, 2003. [Return
to Text]
38. “Chinese Foreign Ministry again makes
solemn representation to Japanese side on
incident of people injured by toxic chemicals
abandoned by Japan,” Xinhua, August
13, 2003. [Return
to Text]
39. Verna Yu, “Hu issues a mild rebuke to
Japan; President tells visiting minister
that relations can be improved 'by reviewing
lessons of the past'” South
China Morning Post ,
August 10, 2003: A6. [Return
to Text]
40. Wu Xiaodong. [Return
to Text]
41. Feng Zhaokui, “Correct Handling of Historical
Problems Remains an Issue,” Liaowang , August
18, 2003. [Return
to Text]
42. Zhang Tianwei, “Pinglun: 8-4 duqi
shijian 'weiwen' buneng daiti 'peichang'"
(Editorial: In the August 4 Incident, 'Condolences'
Cannot Replace 'Compensation') Beijing Qingnian Bao (Beijing
Youth Daily) September 4, 2003, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-09-04/0448685350s.shtml . [Return
to Text]
43. Verna Yu, “Abandoned war-era gas claims
its first victim; China lodges a protest
with Japan over the father's death 18 days
after accident,” South
China Morning Post (August
23, 2003): A4. [Return
to Text]
44. Xinhua (August 22, 2003). [Return
to Text]
45. “Chinese Politburo Member Holds Talks
with Japanese Delegation,” Xinhua , August
25, 2003. [Return
to Text]
46. Liu Hua, “Riben tuoyan jiejue
'yihua' wenti zhenxiang”
(The True Facts Behind Japan's Delay in Resolving the ACW
Issues) Huanqui (The
Globe) September 4, 2003, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-09-04/16231677644.shtml[Return
to Text]
47. The online petition called for Japan
to provide “detailed information about the
specific location of chemical weapons dumps
in China,” provide a broader “compensation
proposal” for all ACW victims, and urged
Japan to remove all ACW weapons from China,
rather than destroy them in China, as the Chinese
government had already agreed to. It also demanded
that Japan fund health checks for residents near
places where chemicals were buried and pay for environmental
damage as well as apologize to and compensate all
ACW victims since 1931. Verna Yu, “Poison gas leak
fuels anti-Japan crusade on Net,” South China Morning
Post , August
22, 2003: A7. [Return
to Text]
48. “Japan Urged to Resolve Weapons Issue,” China Daily ,
October 21, 2003. [Return
to Text]
49. See: Liu Hua, “Riben tuoyan jiejue
'yihua' wenti zhenxiang” (The True Facts
Behind Japan's Delay in Resolving the ACW
Issues) Huanqui (The
Globe) September 4, 2003, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-09-04/16231677644.shtml . [Return
to Text]
50. “Chinese sign up in anger,” Courier Mail (Australia),
September 19, 2003: A 14. [Return
to Text]
51. Jiang Lifeng, “Zhongguo minzhong
dui riben henshao you qingjingan: diyici zhongri
yulun diaocha jieguo fenxi”
(Chinese public rarely feels close to Japan: analysis of the
results of the first China-Japan public opinion
survey) Riben
Xuekan (Japan
Studies) 6 (2002):12; Jane Cai, “Anti-Japanese
sentiment swells among students,” South China Morning
Post, November
10, 2003: A6. [Return
to Text]
52. Lin Wei, “Zhu Hai: riben luyoutuan
gouchiri daohuan, shengcheng laihua zhiwei maichun”
(Zhuhai: Japanese tour group announces that
on China's Day of Humiliation, they have
come to China just for prostitutes) Zhongguo
Qingnian Bao (China
Youth Daily), September 26, 2003, http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2003-09-26/0351820418s.shtml[Return
to Text]
53. Wenran Jiang, “Confronting a poisonous
past,” South China Morning Post ,
September 18, 2003: A 15. [Return
to Text]
54. “Principle of 'Drawing
lessons from history and looking towards
the future' must be upheld in developing
China-Japan relations” Xinhua,
October 11, 2003. [Return
to Text]
55. “WWII cleanup Approved Ahead of Summit,” The Daily
Yomiuri (Tokyo), October
21, 2003: A3. [Return
to Text]
56. Chen Hegao and Che Yuming, “Chinese
President Hu Jintao Meets with Japanese
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi,” Xinhua,
October 20, 2003. Italics added. [Return
to Text]
57. “Positive Cooperation with Japan in
Chemical Weapon's Cleanup,” Xinhua, November
14, 2003. [Return
to Text]
58. In two ACW incidents in spring 2004,
the Chinese Foreign Ministry coordinated
closely with Japan to issue apologies and
funds to victims, and to cleanup the site without
media coverage or public statements. Lu
Yi, 140. [Return
to Text] 59. “Japan Must Show Accountability,” China
Daily, September
24, 2003. [Return
to Text]
60. Interview with Chinese scholar in Beijing
(June 7, 2007). [Return
to Text]
61. Interview with Chinese activist in Shanghai
(February 5, 2007). [Return
to Text]
62. I use the Chinese term “Diaoyu” since
I focus on Chinese policy. This does not
suggest a preference for one country's claim. [Return
to Text]
63. Tian Heng, ed, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi shinian biao:
1945-1993 (Yearbook
of Postwar China-Japan Relations, Vol. 2)
(Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
1994): 92. [Return
to Text]
64. Zhang Tasheng, “Guanyu 21 shiji zhongri
changqi youhao hezuo guanxi de jidian sikao”
(Several thoughts regarding long term cooperation
and friendly cooperation in China-Japan
relations in the 21 st Century) in 21 shiji de zhongguo
yu riben (China
and Japan in the 21 st Century), ed. Chen
Feng (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe,
2006): 34. [Return
to Text]
65. Young C. Kim, “Japanese policy towards
China: politics of the imperial visit to
China in 1992,” Pacific
Affairs 74:
2 (2001): 225–42. [Return
to Text]
66. Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C.
Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of
Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands,” International Security 23:
3 (Winter 1998-99): 114-146. [Return
to Text]
67. Chien-peng Chung, “The Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai/Senkaku
Islands Dispute: Domestic Politics and the
Limits of Diplomacy,” American Asian Review 16:3
(1998): 162. [Return
to Text]
68. Linus Hagstrom, “Quiet power: Japan's
China policy in Regard to the Pinnacle Islands,” The Pacific
Review 18:
2 (June 2005): 176. [Return
to Text]
69. Interview, China Institute for Contemporary
International Relations (May 6, 2008). [Return
to Text]
70. Protesters included Ma Yingjiu, currently
President of Taiwan. Zhu Hongjun, “Haiwai
baodiao 'dilingtuan' huiguo shiwei” (The
Return Visit of the 'Number Zero' Overseas
Baodiao Delegation) Nanfang
Zhoumou (Southern
Weekend), October 6, 2005: B15. [Return
to Text]
71. The preceding summary draws from interviews
with Chinese baodiao activists in Beijing
(June 4-5, 2008). See also the summary at:
http://www.1931 918.org/bbs/dispbbs.asp?boardID=220&ID=1063;
Duan Ninghong, “Daoyu renshi chengli zhongguo
baodiao lianhehui; Dasuan zuyong diaoyudao”
(Diaoyu Leaders Establish the China Diaoyu
Islands Association; Plan to Rent Diaoyu
Islands) Xinjing
Bao (New
Beijing News), January 1, 2004, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-01-01/07241479415s.shtml[Return
to Text]
72. David Fang, “Diaoyu activist pushes
boundaries of protest,” South China Morning Post ,
April 13, 2004: 7. [Return
to Text]
73. Wu Shan, “Zhongguo baodiao tuanti jiejian
hanguo jingyan” (Chinese baodiao group borrows
from the Korean experience) Qingnian Cankao (Youth
Reference) May 11, 2004, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-05-11/14413204658.shtml[Return
to Text]
74. David Fang, “700 Ask to Join Voyage
to Diaoyu Islands,” South China Morning Post ,
March 18, 2004: 8. [Return
to Text]
75. The closest the group came was on January
14, 2004. “Chinese Fishing Boats Attacked
Near Diaoyu Islands,” Xinhua (January
15, 2004). [Return
to Text]
76. “Japan Deported Chinese protesters Under
Political Pressure,” Japan Economic Newswire ,
April 1, 2004. [Return
to Text]
77. Interview, Chinese baodiao activist
(Beijing, June 4, 2008). [Return
to Text]
78. “Waijiaobu fubuzhang Zhang Yesui 24
xiawu jiji yuejian riben dashiguan daibiao”
(Deputy Foreign Minster Zhang Yesui urgently summoned
Japanese Embassy Representative on the Afternoon
of 24 March),” Renmin
Ribao (People's
Daily), March 26, 2004, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/11643/1049573.html[Return
to Text]
79. “Japanese flags burn in Chinese capital” South China
Morning Post ,
March 26, 2004. [Return
to Text]
80. “Deputy Foreign Minster Zhang Yesui.” [Return
to Text]
81. “Japan Deported.” [Return
to Text]
82. Irene Wang and Alice Yan, “Diaoyu Islands
Activists Celebrated as 'Heroes' in Beijing,” South
China Morning Post ,
March 29, 2004. [Return
to Text]
83. Several hundred supporters were waiting
at the Shanghai airport to greet them; however
they were hustled immediately into government
cars and taken to Hangzhou before being
released the next day. Interview with baodiao activist
(Shanghai, July 2, 2006). [Return
to Text]
84. “Beiri feifa kouliude 7 ming zhongguo
gongmin anxuan huilai” (Seven Chinese Activists
who were Illegally Detained By Japan Return
Home) Renmin
Ribao (People's
Daily), March 27, 2004, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/11645/1049678.html[Return
to Text]
85. “China restates Senkakus claim, but
ready to talk with Japan,” Japan Economic Newswire ,
March 30, 2004. [Return
to Text]
86. “Japan bans political group from sailing
for disputed islands,” Kyodo News Service ,
March 25, 2004); Anthony Faiola, “Isles
Become Focus for Old Antagonisms,” Washington Post (March
27, 2004): A13. [Return
to Text]
87. Nailene Chou Wiest, “Souring Sino-Japanese
Ties Spread to Business,” South China Morning Post (April
6, 2004): 7. [Return
to Text]
88. Liu Xiaobiao, a Chinese scholar quoted
in: David Fang, “Diaoyu activist,” 7. [Return
to Text]
89. Renmin Ribao only provided
two brief factual accounts of the incident
after the activists' return had been essentially
secured, both buried on page four. PRC-controlled
press in Hong Kong was similarly moderate.
See : “Resolutely
Safeguard Sovereignty, Soberly Deal With
the Incident,” Wen Wei Po (March
25, 2004). [Return
to Text] 90. Ming
Pao , an independent Hong Kong paper,
issued a fiery editorial attacking “China's
forbearance…as cowardice,” and arguing that
“Beijing should dump its policy of mollifying
Japan. It should take a tough stand when
dealing with matters concerning sovereignty and territorial
integrity.” “Diaoyu Activists are Patriots; China Must Protect
Them” Ming
Pao ,
March 25, 2004: A4; Agnes Cheung, “H.K.
protesters urge tougher Chinese stance on
isle dispute,” Japan
Economic Newswire (March
25, 2004). [Return
to Text]
91. “Parliament panel urges prevention of
illegal landing on Senkaku Isles,” Kyodo News Service ,
March 30, 2004. [Return
to Text]
92. “Japan Has No Right to Claim Diaoyu
Islands,” China
Daily (April
2, 2004). [Return
to Text]
93. “Diaoyu renshi Feng Jinhua deng xiang
rizhuhua dashi dijiao qianzeshu” (Diaoyu
Activist Feng Jinhua and Others Submit a
Demand Note to the Japanese Embassy in Beijing) Xinjing
Bao (New
Beijing News), April 24, 2004, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-04-24/07533162116.shtml[Return
to Text]
94. Wang Shaopu, “Jianchi cong zhanlue quanju
bawo he quli zhongri guanxi” (Continue to
seize and manage China-Japan relations from
a comprehensive strategic perspective),
in China-Japan
Relations in the 21 st Century, ed.
Chen Feng (Beijing: World Knowledge Press:
2006): 15. [Return
to Text]
95. “PRC, HK Media on Diaoyu Islands Situation,”
China- FBIS Report, March 20, 2005. [Return
to Text]
96. Zhang Tasheng, 34. [Return
to Text]
97. Li Yu and Fan Shiming, “2007 Zhongri
guanxi yulun diaocha baogao,” (2007 Report
on Public Opinion in China-Japan Relations), presented
at the Third Beijing-Tokyo Forum, Beiijing,
China on August 28, 2007. [Return
to Text] 98. Dongya
Sanguode Jindai Lishi (Three
Northeast Asian Countries' Modern History)
(Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press,
2005). [Return
to Text]