JPRI Occasional Paper No. 24: January 2002
Okinawa Between the United States and Japan
by Chalmers Johnson

The United States is today virtually the only nation on earth that maintains large contingents of its armed forces in other people's countries. After World War II and during the Cold War, the U.S. built a chain of military bases stretching from Japan and South Korea through Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany, England, and Iceland-- in effect ringing the Soviet Union and China with literally thousands of overseas military installations. In Japan alone, immediately following the Korean War, there were six hundred U.S. installations and approximately two hundred thousand troops. There are still today, ten years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, some eight hundred U.S. Department of Defense facilities located outside the United States, ranging from radio relay stations to major air bases. To those unlucky enough to live near them (and sometimes dependent upon them for work and customers), these military outposts often appear less like "peacekeepers" than occupiers.

In East Asia, the U.S. maintains massive and expensive military forces poised to engage in everything from nuclear war to sabotage of governments that Washington finds inconvenient (e.g., the government of former President Suharto in Indonesia, which in May 1998 the U.S. government helped to bring down via troops its Special Forces had trained).1 At the beginning of the 21st century, the United States still deploys some 100,000 military personnel and close to an equal number of civilian workers and dependents in Japan and South Korea. These forces include the Third Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa and Japan; the Second Infantry Division in South Korea; numerous Air Force squadrons in both countries (Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa is the largest U.S. military installation outside the United States); the Seventh Fleet, with its headquarters in Yokosuka, Japan, patrolling the China coast and anywhere else that it wants to go; and innumerable submarine pens (e.g., White Beach, Okinawa), support facilities, clandestine eavesdropping and intelligence collecting units, Special Forces, and staff and headquarters installations all over the Pacific.

Japan as an American Satellite

From approximately 1950 to 1990, the U.S. government invoked the Cold War to justify these so-called "forward deployments"-- actually, in less euphemistic language, imperialist outposts. During the late 1940s, when it became apparent that the Chinese Communist Party was going to win the Chinese civil war, the United States reversed its policies of attempting to democratize occupied Japan and instead devoted itself to making Japan the U.S.'s leading satellite in East Asia. The new strategy was not that different from the Soviet Union's in setting up and maintaining its satellites in Eastern Europe, except for the economic policies the U.S. devised for Japan and its other satellites in East Asia. These policies rested on two fundamental American beliefs: that the poverty-stricken nations of postwar East Asia could never compete successfully with the United States and were therefore no economic threat to it, and that economic growth was one very important way to divert the people of these nations from the attractions of socialism, neutralism, communism, or other anti-American orientations.

The United States entered into an informal bargain with its dependencies in East Asia, of which Japan was the first and by far the most important. In return for the Asian nations' willingness to tolerate the indefinite deployment of American weapons and troops on their soil, the United States would give these countries preferential access to the American market and would tolerate their protectionism and mercantilism. These were advantages the U.S. did not extend to its European allies or Latin American neighbors in the Cold War.

This basic policy is still in effect more than a half-century after it was first implemented-- in return for accepting American troops on its territory Japan still takes as its due privileged access to the American economy and maintains its protectionist barriers against American sales and investment in the Japanese market. The overall results had become apparent by the 1970s and resulted in acute problems for the American economy in the 1980s-- namely, the hollowing out of American manufacturing industries and the largest trade imbalances (in Japan's favor) ever recorded between two economies. During the year 2000, the United States recorded its largest trade deficit ever, with imports from Japan exceeding exports to Japan by some $81 billion.

Post-Cold War Justifications of "Forward Deployment"

Meanwhile, from the point of view of American elites committed to maintaining American hegemony on a global basis, the sudden and unpredicted collapse of the Soviet Union in the period 1989 to 1991 was a disaster. They had to find some new justifications for their overseas presence, particularly in East Asia, where Japan's inherent power and the emergence of a commercially oriented China offered implicit challenges to the old American order. Among these justifications, one of the cleverest was the so-called two-war strategy, which calls for the U.S. military establishment to be able to fight two large wars on opposite sides of the globe at the same time. The beauty of this formulation is that it avoids specifying which nations might conceivably want to go to war with the United States and ignores the historical fact that in the most recent American wars-- Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Yugoslavia-- no second nation (on the other side of the globe or nearby) challenged it.

More concretely, Pentagon strategists have tried to find replacement enemies for the former USSR by demonizing North Korea and muttering ominously about China's successful transition from a Leninist command economy to a state-guided market economy resembling the other successful economies of East Asia. Until June 2000, North Korea was routinely described as an extremely threatening "rogue state." Then, on the initiative of the South Korean president, the two Koreas began to negotiate their own peaceful reunification without asking the United States for permission. The possibility that North and South Korea might achieve some form of peaceful coexistence totally undercuts the main U.S. rationale for a "national missile defense" and a "theatre missile defense."

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious American militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a defensive deterrent against the overwhelming American power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese nuclear warheads versus over 7,000 American nuclear warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo in 1914 led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the U.S. and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan, and probably end in a Chinese victory. In any case, forward-deployed American forces on China's borders have virtually no deterrent effect on China's decision-making concerning Taiwan, given the nationalistic challenge to China's sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to formally declare its independence.2

Still another reason why U.S. forces say they must remain in Asia, particularly in Japan, is that Japan itself may once again become a threat to its neighbors. Known as "the cork in the bottle" theory (a phrase invented by a former U.S. Marine commandant in Okinawa), this argument is increasingly distasteful to Japanese, who point out that paying for American bases on their own soil as watchdogs is like paying for their own jailers.3 The Japanese also argue that their past history and current demographics (20 percent of the population over sixty-five and a below-replacement birth rate) make revived militarism about as likely as revived slavery in the United States.

In lieu of concrete security threats in East Asia, some U.S. strategists have put forth the argument that if so much as a single American soldier is brought home, the result will be "instability." This was the contribution of a Harvard University professor, Joseph Nye, whom the Pentagon hired during the mid-1990s to think up some reasons why it should keep its bases in East Asia.4 Actually, there has been a good deal of instability in East Asia despite the American military presence, from the economic meltdown of 1997 to the most serious cases of nuclear proliferation in forty years in India and Pakistan and the destruction of East Timor by American-trained Indonesian forces while the U.S. looked on.5

The U.S. government often argues that it must remain in East Asia because there are no regional organizations comparable to the European Union that could deal with problems there. The fact is that the U.S. has a long record of undercutting efforts at regional organization; and its military presence interferes with the functioning of the most promising regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Why Is the U.S. Still in Okinawa?

Why, then, does the U.S. continue to maintain Cold War structures in East Asia even though it knows they are no longer relevant to actual conditions in the area? First and above all, money. The Japanese government pays more generously than any other "ally," about $6 billion a year, to keep American Marines and other forces in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan. It does this partly to keep the American troops as much as possible away from the main islands, where politically potent voters could and would demand their withdrawal. Okinawa is a culturally-distinct territory that Japan forcibly annexed to its empire late in the nineteenth century-- a Japanese version of Puerto Rico or Hawaii. The Japanese hold deep-seated attitudes of superiority toward the Okinawans, just as they do toward other peoples they colonized, including Koreans, Chinese, and Taiwanese.6 The fact that the U.S. goes along with this openly discriminatory policy-- 75 percent of the American facilities in Japan are located in Okinawa, which comprises only six-tenths of one percent of Japan's land area (see Table 1)-- is morally catastrophic for its claims of being in East Asia to promote democracy and stability.

Former commander of Marine forces in the Pacific, Gen. Carlton W. Fulford, wrote in the Marine Corps Gazette of July 1999, "In 1996, estimates for the plant replacement value (PRV) of Marine Corps infrastructure on Okinawa was $7.5 billion. The PRV for III MEF [Third Marine Expeditionary Force] assets on mainland Japan exceeded $2 billion. Finding replacement sites for our current Japanese facilities would
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SOURCES: Chii Kyotei Kenkyukai (Status of Forces Agreement Research Association), ed., Nichi-Bei chii kyotei chikujo hihan (Point by Point Criticism of the Japanese-American Status of Forces Agreement) (Tokyo: Shin Nihon Shuppansha, 1997), pp. 253-56; U.S. Forces Media Liaison Office, Tokyo; Author's comments.
prove fiscally unsupportable."7 Gen. Fulford's argument is similar to that of the former Soviet armed forces who wanted to remain in East Germany after the Berlin Wall was torn down. They could not afford to go home.

The other main reason U.S. armed forces want to stay in East Asia is that they like it there. They live well, better than they could in the United States. The officers' clubs, family apartments, swimming pools, private beaches, gymnasia, churches, restaurants, golf courses, baseball diamonds, bowling alleys, and slot-machine parlors-- all run by the military and beyond local legal jurisdiction-- are powerful incentives to stay on. During the Asian financial crisis, the price of a prostitute in Bangkok catering to visiting American forces fell from US$60 to under $30.

The down side of the American military presence is an endless series of raped, battered, and sometimes murdered women and girls; U.S. armed forces drunken drivers involved in hit-and-run accidents; environmental pollution; the noise of warplanes and helicopters perpetually interrupting daily life (near some bases, such as Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, sounds exceed 70 decibels on an average of 161 times every day); and the seemingly monthly apologies by American ambassadors to host governments for outrages-- so-called tragic accidents-- that no American citizen would tolerate in his or her own society.

Japan, Okinawa, and the Security Treaty

These problems are acute wherever American bases are located in Japan and South Korea, but nowhere have they come closer to eliciting open revolt than in Japan's poorest prefecture, Okinawa. At least three times in the past the Okinawan people have risen in mass protest: during the mid- and late-1950s over forcible U.S. seizures of privately-owned land; in 1970 over the Vietnam War; and in 1995 over the gang rape of an elementary school girl by three U.S. servicemen. During the years 2000 and 2001 the governor of Okinawa, Keiichi Inamine, repeatedly warned the local U.S. military commanders that they were camped on the side of a rumbling volcano-- his way of saying that the island's people seethe with hatred for their uninvited foreign guests.

The Japanese-American Security Treaty, first signed in 1952 and revised in 1960, stipulates that Japan is to provide the land for American military installations. In mainland Japan, most of the land used by the Americans is old property of the former Imperial Japanese armed forces-- e.g., Yokosuka Naval Base, where the docks used by the carrier task force of the U.S. Seventh Fleet were built for the Japanese navy during the Taisho era (1912-26). The mainland bases are also widely dispersed throughout the country, even though there are repeated calls that the United States return particular properties to Japan-- e.g., the demands during the years 2000 and 2001 by the mayor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, that the U.S. give back Yokota Air Force Base, located in Tokyo's western suburbs.

In Okinawa, the thirty-seven American military bases constitute an overwhelming and inescapable presence. They create political and moral problems of much more acute dimensions than anywhere else in East Asia that plays host to U.S. forces. In 1995, the year of the major rape incident, there were 27,676 U.S. military personnel in Okinawa (18,081 Marine Corps, 7,244 Air Force, 1,441 Navy, and 910 Army) compared to 16,209 in all the rest of Japan (3,042 Marine Corps, 7,730 Air Force, 4,420 Navy, and 1,017 Army). In addition, there were 2,150 American civilians employed by the U.S. military in Okinawa (2,915 in mainland Japan), plus thousands of dependents and an estimated 20,000 abandoned offspring of U.S. soldiers and Okinawan women. About two hundred more American-Okinawan babies are born every year, which averages out, conservatively, to one child per every hundred servicemen. After fathering these children, "United States servicemen left the island with no reprisals, and there was no agreement in force between Japan and the United States to make them pay child support."8 Britain and Germany have negotiated agreements with the U.S, other governments to compel NATO troops to pay for the families they leave behind.9

Since 1945 to the present, Okinawa has been an American military colony. From the Battle of Okinawa in the spring of 1945 until the peace treaty of 1952, U.S. military officers ruled the Ryukyu Islands directly under a form of martial law. In the peace treaty, Okinawa was excepted from its terms; and from 1952 to 1972, the U.S. military retained Okinawa as its exclusive possession while disguising its de facto legal status by giving Japan an undefined and practically meaningless "residual sovereignty" over it.

In order to head off recurrent demands for democracy and extension of the stipulations of the Japanese Constitution of 1947 to the local people, the United States did permit a puppet government of Okinawans to come into being. This Government of the Ryukyu Islands was subject to the frequently used veto of the U.S. High Commissioner for the Ryukyus, who was invariably a U.S. Army lieutenant general. In 1957, for example, the high commissioner ordered the removal of the popularly elected mayor of Okinawa's capital city, Naha, Senaga Kamijiro, because he had been a leader of protests against the U.S.'s seizures of private lands for more bases. In November 1968, for the first time, the U.S. allowed the popular election of the chief executive of the Ryukyuan government (he had been appointed until then), which resulted in the overwhelming election of Yara Chobyo, a former schoolteacher, on a platform of immediate reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

Sensing that protests against the Vietnam War were making continued U.S. military dominion over Okinawa untenable, the United States colluded with the government of Japan to return Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. The terms of reversion, however, many of them secret and only now coming to light, perpetuated the American bases unchanged, although they were now brought under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, the secret arrangements exempted the U.S. from the requirement in the Security Treaty that it consult with the government of Japan about such issues as the uses of the American forces on Okinawa or the presence of nuclear weapons by simply agreeing that Japan would never ask for consultations about such matters.10

In many ways, the period from 1972 to 1990 was the "golden age" of American military colonialism in Okinawa. The United States was no longer formally responsible for the Okinawans' grievances about their presence, and Japan was pouring in money to try to bring the primitive economic conditions it inherited from the U.S. somewhat closer to those of the mainland. Per capita income jumped from «440,000 in 1972 to «1.99 million in fiscal year 1990. In 1992, the leading authority on the U.S. occupation of Okinawa, Miyagi Etsujiro of Ryukyu University, wrote, "The islands now boast high-rise buildings, improved highway networks, better port and airport facilities, gleaming resort hotels along the beaches, and a tourist population of more than three million yearly."11

But the problems persisted. Okinawa still had the lowest per capita income and the highest unemployment rate (4.4 percent in 1989) in the nation, and it had no control over how it used its resources, protected its environment, or planned for its future. The money from the central government came with clear strings attached: in return for Japanese subsidies, the Okinawans were expected to tolerate the then forty-five American military installations so that Japan could continue its lucrative trade-for-bases relationship with the U.S. without having to take any bases itself. Many Okinawans who had fought for reversion to Japan up to 1972 became hopelessly disillusioned.12 Equally significant, between reversion in 1972 and the year 2000, the Okinawan Prefectural Assembly passed some 152 resolutions calling for the removal or reduction of the American bases, an average of five per year, all of them ignored by Tokyo and Washington.13

The Ota Era

In December 1990, a recently retired university professor, Ota Masahide, ran for governor of Okinawa prefecture on a platform of removing all U.S. bases from Okinawa and preserving the so-called peace constitution. His victory put an end to twelve years of local conservative administration. Ota was not a typical Japanese politician. He was born in 1925 in Kume, one of the smaller Ryukyu Islands, and was conscripted and wounded as a young man during the Battle of Okinawa. After the war he received a B.A. in English literature from Waseda University and an M.A. in journalism from Syracuse University in New York. From 1958 to 1990 he was a professor in the University of the Ryukyus, where he also served as chairman of the Sociology Department and as Dean of the College of Law and Letters. He has written some fifty-four books in Japanese and English on the "typhoon of steel," Okinawa's metaphor for the Battle of Okinawa, and its troubled relations with both Japan and the United States.

In 1990, emeritus professor Ota won the gubernatorial election in part by opposing the unpopular bill then pending in the Diet in Tokyo for Japan to supply troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations. However, once elected, he had to put his anti-base efforts on hold because the Persian Gulf War had reinvigorated America's interest in its Okinawan enclaves. Washington simply ignored Ota's repeated requests to discuss the status of the bases, saying that it could deal directly only with Japan's central government.14

All this changed in 1995 because of two developments. First, in February 1995, the Pentagon published its so-called Nye Report, which asserted that the United States intended to deploy a hundred thousand U.S. troops in Japan and South Korea for at least the next twenty years. This unilateral pronouncement ended any hopes of a post-Cold War peace dividend for Okinawa. Second, on September 4, 1995, two U.S. Marines and a sailor gang-raped a twelve-year-old Okinawan girl picked out at random, and the United States tried to treat it as just another "tragic incident." This last development made clear precisely what Professor Nye's Pentagon plans held in store for ordinary Okinawans and made Ota Masahide one of the two best-known and most popular politicians in Japan (the other was Kan Naoto, who as Minister of Welfare had revealed how the pharmaceutical industry had bribed officials not to reveal that Japan's blood supply had been tainted with the HIV virus). Ota instantly became one of the biggest thorns in the sides of both the Tokyo and Washington administrators of the Japanese-American relationship.

From the period 1996 to 1998, Governor Ota tirelessly pursued the goal of trying to get the Japanese to feel some remorse and the Americans some shame for their ruthless exploitation of Okinawa. He used political means-- for example, the prefecture-wide plebiscite of September 8, 1996, in which by a ratio of nine to one, just under 60 percent of Okinawan voters endorsed a reduction of the bases.15 He used legal means-- for example, his impassioned appeal of July 10, 1996, to the Supreme Court of Japan that the mainland share some of the burdens it so readily foisted onto Okinawa. He used confrontational means-- for example, his 1996 refusal to sign the papers extending the leases on private property seized for American bases. In May 1991 he had reluctantly signed, thereby provoking the anger of some three thousand antiwar landlords who had supported him in the previous year's election. When he refused to sign in 1996, the Japanese government simply enacted a new law that took the power to certify such documents away from prefectural governments and transferred it to the central government.16

Ota's efforts led to a mass movement, spearheaded by a new organization entitled Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence that had come into being among women who attended the U.N.'s Fourth Conference on Women in Beijing just at the time the rape occurred back in Okinawa. The movement's first major achievement was the rally of October 21, 1965, when 85,000 people gathered at Ginowan's Seaside Park to protest the rape, the largest anti-American demonstrations in Japan since the Security Treaty riots of 1960. The movement mobilized a broad coalition of antiwar landlords, women, people who remembered the Battle of Okinawa and the hard years that followed it, and peace activists concerned that Okinawa not be devastated in a future war as it had been in World War II.

Japan and the United States became alarmed by these developments. They set up a so-called Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to recommend ways "to reduce the impact of U.S. military operations and training on the people of Okinawa." In its final report of December 2, 1996, SACO came up with schemes to "realign, consolidate, or reduce" some twenty-seven different facilities, the most famous of which was its proposal to relocate Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, entirely surrounded by the city of Ginowan, to an off-shore facility at Henoko, a suburb of the northern Okinawan city of Nago. This new replacement airport would have to be built using untested technology at an environmentally important and delicate site. As it has turned out, virtually all of the SACO proposals were a smokescreen-- a pretense of action that Washington and Tokyo knew would become bogged down in the details of implementation. In his speech in Okinawa during the July 2000 summit meeting of the so-called G-8 democracies plus Russia, President Bill Clinton asserted that fifteen of the twenty-seven proposals had "already been implemented." But, in fact, only one facility, the Aha Training Ground, has actually been returned to its owners. There are, as of this writing, no prospects for the return of any of the other places named in the SACO report-- Futenma, the Ginbaru training field, Yomitan auxiliary airfield, Senaha radio facility, Makiminato service area, or the Naha port facility. As the Tokyo Shimbun reported, "The government had padded out its implementation list."17

Tokyo Stage-Manages Ota's Defeat

By the beginning of 1998, the bureaucrats of the Japanese central government, urged on by their counterparts in the Pentagon, were determined to get rid of Ota. His opposition to the bases had begun to interfere with a new U.S. strategy to prod Japan into a more activist military stance. The U.S. also wanted to ensure that in any future American military action in East Asia or elsewhere around the world it could use its military bases in Japan and Okinawa on the same terms as during the Korean and Vietnamese wars. In those days, the U.S. did not have to worry about Japan's agreeing with its policies since, during the Korean War, Japan itself was still under American military occupation and, during the Vietnam War, Okinawa was still under American military occupation. Prompted by the growing American hostility to the regime in North Korea, the U.S. military was preparing for possible renewed intervention on the Korean peninsula, and many Japanese within the government went along with these plans.

On September 23, 1997, Japanese and U.S. officials signed new U.S.-Japan "guidelines" for defense cooperation, a de facto unratified revision of the Security Treaty. These new guidelines, replacing the old ones of 1978 that had focused on the threat of the Soviet Union, give the U.S. the power to take over Japanese airfields, ports, hospitals, roads, and other facilities for military use whenever the U.S. government unilaterally declares an emergency. The new guidelines also make easier U.S. sales of ever more sophisticated weapons to Japan, whose military budget by the late-1990s was on a par with France's and well ahead of China's.

The new guidelines created a much greater sense of a robust, active military alliance between Japan and the United States, one oriented toward maintaining America's global hegemony in a post-Cold War world rather than merely defending Japan. They also seemed to produce behavioral changes. As Fukuchi Hiroaki, director of the Okinawan Human Rights Association, observed, "Their [the U.S. forces] `occupation mentality' has increased since the enactment of the new-Guidelines related laws. With their military exercises becoming more intense, their behavior becomes more audacious. The U.S. forces have come to think that they are understood and accepted by the Japanese people because the Japanese government is supporting U.S. military strategy."18 Ota's vigorous anti-base campaign threatened these new arrangements.

When Governor Ota announced that he would run for a third term in gubernatorial elections scheduled for November 15, 1998, the central Tokyo government prepared to oust him. The Liberal Democratic Party had already laid the groundwork with a classic campaign of kinken-seiji (power-of-money politics). In November 1996, then Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro and his chief cabinet secretary Kajiyama Seiroku authorized a former diplomat and well-known specialist on back-channel relations with the U.S., Okamoto Yukio, to create a personal cabinet advisory group on the Okinawa problem. In his new role, Okamoto set up a "special compensation fund" of a hundred billion yen to buy the support of local Okinawan politicians in towns and villages where U.S. bases were located. The front organization for these operations was known as the "Okinawa Beigun Kichi Shozai Shichoson ni kan-suru Kondankai" (Discussion Group on Okinawan Municipalities Hosting U.S. Bases), headed by Professor Shimada Haruo of Keio University, "who has been a vital conduit enabling the central government to implement policies on Okinawa underhandedly."19

In order to defeat Ota, who had deep popular support in Okinawa, Tokyo first had to find a suitable candidate and then create conditions under which the public would rally to him. In July 1998, Obuchi Keizo succeeded the unpopular Hashimoto as prime minister and proved to be much more adroit than his predecessor. As a former foreign minister, Obuchi was well informed about the problems Ota posed for Tokyo's smooth relations with Washington and, differing from most mainland Japanese, he had a long-standing personal interest in Okinawa. When he was a student during the 1960s, Obuchi had visited Okinawa and participated in the movement toward reversion; he had even met the then leftist-governor Chobyo Yara.20 Obuchi's first cabinet post, in November 1979, had been as director general of the Okinawa Development Agency.

As prime minister, Obuchi strongly endorsed the LDP's candidate to stand against Ota-- namely Inamine Keiichi (b. 1933), the eldest son of one of Okinawa's legendary power-brokers, Inamine Ichiro, and the successor to his father as president of Ryukyu Sekiyu, the islands' leading petroleum company. During the war, Ichiro was an official of the South Manchurian Railway, and during the pre-1972 period of American colonialism in Okinawa, he profited greatly from building and servicing the various bases. After reversion, Inamine Ichiro served three terms as an upper house LDP Diet member from Okinawa.

His son, Inamine Keiichi, ran a clever gubernatorial campaign. He did not directly challenge Ota's positions on the bases but insisted that the governor was an unrealistic dreamer whose devotion to peace was undercutting Okinawa's economy. To help drive home Inamine's point, Tokyo suspended virtually all contacts with Ota during 1998 and cut off Okinawa's normal flow of subsidies. The result was that by August 1998, Okinawa's unemployment rate was 9.2 percent, the worst ever recorded and twice the national average. Inamine referred to Okinawa's "recession caused by the prefectural government" and promised that with his Tokyo contacts he could reopen the money pipelines. On election day, the LDP festooned the island with political posters whose sole slogan was "9.2 percent."21 Ota, nonetheless, stood his ground. As the American journalist Gregg Jones reported from Naha at the time, "Even when the national government froze hundred of millions of dollars in economic aid to Okinawa this year because of [Ota's] refusal to back off on the bases, the 73-year-old governor didn't budge. Defiantly, he campaigned for re-election with the slogan: `Okinawans, Don't Sell Your Souls.'"22

Inamine ingratiated himself with Tokyo by publicly endorsing the idea of moving Futenma Marine Corps Air Station to a new offshore facility in Nago that was yet to be built. Ota took the opposite point of view. He flatly opposed any relocation of Futenma within Okinawa prefecture and called on Tokyo to move it to the Japanese mainland or else get the Americans based there to go home. Inamine risked alienating Okinawan voters with his stand, but he compensated by promising that he would get the Japanese government to put a fifteen-year time limit on the U.S.'s use of the new airport and also make it dual (part-civilian) use. After the election, the U.S. said it could not accept either time limits or dual use, and the Japanese government, as usual, went along with the Americans. As the prominent Okinawan scholar and specialist on the base issues, Gabe Masaaki, noted, Inamine is the first governor since World War II actually to ask for the construction of a new U.S. base.23

In the election itself, Inamine took 52.1 percent of the vote compared to Ota's 46.9 percent. Unemployed young people voted overwhelmingly for Inamine, whereas older people who remembered the war and those with jobs voted for Ota. Inamine was also helped by secret payoffs of well over «100 million from the prime minister's office. Obuchi took these funds from the Foreign Ministry's off-budget accounts that diplomats normally used to wine and dine LDP Diet members when they travel overseas. Disclosure in early 2001 of the existence of this Foreign Ministry slush fund and its corrupt use led to one of the country's biggest postwar scandals involving government officials.24

On December 11, 1998, the day after Governor Inamine was inaugurated, Prime Minister Obuchi paid off. He scheduled the first meetings in thirteen months of the Ministerial Committee on Okinawa Policies, and he used unspecified "special adjustment expenditures" to authorize twice the funds that had ever been made available to Ota. And four months later, in April 1999, Obuchi really delivered, when he announced that Nago, Okinawa, would host the 2000 G-8 summit meeting. In order to make Nago and the rest of Okinawa ready for this event, which both President Clinton of the United States and President Putin of Russia attended, Japan spent truly monumental sums. Whereas the British government spent the equivalent of 1.1 billion yen on the 1998 Birmingham summit and the Germans had needed only the equivalent of 700 million yen for the 1999 summit in Cologne, the Japanese government lavished 81 billion yen ($1.3 billion) on the Okinawan summit.

Unfortunately, Obuchi was unable to attend since he unexpectedly died in April 2000. His successor, Mori Yoshiro, presided over what the Tokyo press almost universally described as a junket for foreigners and a pay-off to Okinawan conservatives that accomplished nothing. In order to ensure security, Japan flew in some 22,000 extra police, which turned Okinawa into what one visiting journalist called a "tropical Alcatraz," while still failing to prevent some serious breaches of security by American servicemen.25 Meanwhile, on July 20, 2000, some 27,000 people formed a human chain 10.8 miles long around Kadena Air Force Base to protest its presence; and on July 24, 2000, President Clinton, speaking at the Camp Foster Marine Base, told the Americans, "You will never know how many wars you have deterred."26

The Golden Days of the Inamine-Tokyo-Washington Axis

Inamine seemed a fine pawn for both Tokyo and Washington. Shortly after assuming office, he set out quietly to alter some of the exhibits in the New Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, which opened on April 1, 2000. Tableaux vivants depicting atrocities committed against Okinawan civilians by Imperial Japanese Army troops during the Battle of Okinawa were toned down, something that pleased the Japanese government greatly.27 And during the summit meeting in July 2000, Inamine was a model host, allowing President Clinton to make a speech in front of Okinawa's war memorial in which Clinton equated Okinawa's desire for peace with a desire to maintain the U.S. presence in East Asia. Ota, by contrast, denounced Clinton's speech as a "desecration" of the dead and "contrary to the spirit of the monument."28 The memorial is built on the cliffs of Mabuni at the southern tip of Okinawa, where many civilians leapt to their deaths during the last days of the Battle of Okinawa. It is composed of 116 black marble tablets on which are inscribed the names of 237,969 people, civilian and military, Okinawan and Japanese, American and Korean, who perished during the fighting. Its construction was one of the crowning achievements of the Ota administration.

Inamine also worked hard to consolidate his political position and help elect his fellow conservatives and reactionaries as mayors and members of the Prefectural Assembly and city councils, a project at which he was generally successful. The first assembly election since Inamine became governor took place on June 11, 2000. It was widely seen as a test of his economic policies. Although it was a lackluster contest-- no one was much interested, and it produced the lowest voter turnout since reversion in 1972-- Inamine's LDP managed to win twenty-seven seats in the forty-eight-seat Assembly giving the conservatives a stable majority. This figure rose to thirty after members of New Komeito (the Buddhist party), which was part of the national coalition with the LDP in Tokyo, joined forces with the Okinawa LDP.

Later that year, on November 12, 2000, the capital city of Naha, which had elected anti-base mayors for the previous thirty-two years, chose the former secretary general of the Okinawa branch of the LDP as its new mayor. According to the Asahi, the issue was "Whether Okinawa prefecture should toe the national line and beg for central government cash, or stick with Naha's independent stance on peace issues, ignoring the financial cost." The paper wrote that citizens of Naha certainly do not see the Marines as "good neighbors," which is the United States's official pretense, but they were irritated that the new money Inamine was bringing in had gone mostly to Nago and northern Okinawa, short-changing Naha. They became "resigned to accepting the U.S. presence in exchange for cash" and voted to take their pay-offs.29

Inamine's last big victory came in the mayoral race for the port city of Urasoe. This is where the Americans and Japanese want to relocate Naha's huge and largely idle military port facilities (no more than ten U.S. Navy vessels visit it each year). The relocation was promised back in 1974, as the Vietnam War was winding down, and the Americans said they would finally do so in the SACO report of 1996. But in 1997, Urasoe elected a mayor who said that he would not accept the U.S. military port unless the central government would also build him a new civilian port. In the election of February 2001, the political forces willing to accept the U.S. military port, led by a former speaker of the Okinawa prefectural assembly, triumphed. However, this still does not necessarily mean that the port will be moved. As the Yomiuri noted, Urasoe's small port will need "a huge amount of investment from state coffers," and the Ministry of Finance is not ready to proceed until it can find tax resources to cover the costs.30

Throughout 1999 and 2000, the Pentagon pushed hard to remilitarize Japan and prepare the Japanese government to support possible American wars in North Korea, the Taiwan Strait, Indonesia, and many other so-called trouble spots. These efforts culminated in the "Armitage Report," released by the U.S. National Defense University on October 11, 2000. Written by a group of right-wing militarists in Washington in a bid for being appointed to high government positions in a new George W. Bush Republican administration (as both Richard Armitage and Paul D. Wolfowitz, signers of the report, subsequently were), it calls for "an expanded Japanese role in the transpacific alliance" and calls on Japan to modify its Constitution and drop its famous anti-war clause (article nine).31 Another signer of the Armitage report, Kurt Campbell, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and the Pacific in the Clinton administration and one of Ota's primary antagonists, was so delighted by developments in Okinawa and Japan that he wrote, "The reality was and is that, for much of the U.S. national security apparatus, nothing could be more comfortable than an ally [Japan] that provides bases, generous host-nation support, and does not want to be consulted."32

The Conservatives Turn Anti-Base

This fairy-tale vision of Japan as the perfect satellite began to disappear during the Okinawa summit meeting in July 2000 and was totally gone by January 2001. On January 19, 2001, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly for the first time in its history voted unanimously, and with the LDP leaders' enthusiastic backing, to ask the U.S. Marines to get out of their prefecture. On February 24, 2001, Governor Inamine formally declared to Foreign Minister Kono Yohei that the people of Okinawa "can no longer bear" the burden of hosting the overwhelming majority of U.S. military forces in Japan. The hopeless predicament of the people of Okinawa had prevailed against the Tokyo-Washington machinations to fill Okinawa's main political offices with paid-off puppets. As the Okinawa Times put it on the last day of the summit, "The Okinawan people know from bitter experience that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty guarantees the security of the nation by ignoring the security of the people."33

Many things contributed to this change of heart, virtually none of them reported in the American press and only as inside pages or local news in the mainland Japanese press.34 Several ongoing issues include the astonishing rise in crime rates among U.S. servicemen (prosecutors in Okinawa received more reports of G.I. crimes in 1999 than in any year since 1991) and the doubling of the incidence of gonorrhea among U.S. troops, particularly drug-resistant strains, from 1999 to 2000.35 The press calls these Beihei waisetsu jiken (Marine obscenity incidents).

The first major case occurred two weeks before the summit meeting and threatened to produce mass demonstrations during the elaborately prepared event. In the middle of the night on July 3, 2000, a drunk nineteen-year-old Marine from Futenma, celebrating the United States's independence day, broke into a private home and climbed into bed with a fourteen-year-old girl. Her screams caused her mother to call the police, who found the Marine sound asleep and arrested him. Lt. Gen. Earl Hailston, the highest ranking Marine in Okinawa and the official who the following January would drive most Okinawans to demand, unsuccessfully, that the Pentagon fire him, called on Governor Inamine at Prefectural Government Headquarters, bowed stiffly, and apologized "for the incident and for the anxiety it has created."36

A week later, at 3 AM in the morning, a twenty-one-year-old airman from Kadena Air Force Base hit a pedestrian in Okinawa City and fled from the scene. He later returned and claimed to police that an unidentified Marine had done it, but he soon confessed and was arrested. It seemed to many Japanese that the Americans were simply unable to control their troops at a time when they should have been on their best behavior. The Okinawa Prefectural Assembly passed a resolution condemning the U.S. military for failing to change its ways. In Tokyo, Ambassador Thomas Foley, by now quite experienced in doing so, apologized profusely and ordered a midnight to 5 AM curfew on drinking by U.S. service personnel.

Over U.S. military protest, the curfew lasted until January 5, 2001. On the day it was lifted, the Japanese police charged three U.S. Marines, crew members on board the U.S.S. Essex based at Sasebo in Kyushu, with molesting two junior high-school girls.37 On January 9, in Okinawa, Marine Corporal Raven Gogol, twenty-one-years-old and based at Camp Hansen, approached a sixteen-year-old girl sitting on a wall beside a flower garden, lifted her skirt, and took pictures of her underwear with his digital camera. A group of local boys chased him into a store, where he was held until he could be arrested.

In commenting on what came to be known as the "lewd photo incident," Governor Inamine said, "We set up a working group comprising the [Japanese] government, the OPG [Okinawa Prefectural Government], and municipal authorities to find means of preventing this kind of thing from happening. We have filed complaints time and again, each time any such incident has occurred. I feel full of regret that the USFO [U.S. Forces, Okinawa] has not yet learned from the lessons of the past." 38

Corporal Gogol pleaded guilty to a charge of disturbing the peace, and on January 26 was released after paying a «50,000 fine (about US$427). Meanwhile, on January 14, a U.S. Navy chief petty officer and a civilian employee at Futenma were arrested for injuring the fifty-nine-year-old female proprietor of the bar in Hetona, Kunigami village, in which they were drinking when she asked them to take their quarrel outside. However, the attitude of various high-ranking American military officers made matters worse. On January 11, the Washington Post quoted retired Marine Colonel Gary Anderson, who had been the commandant of Camp Hansen in 1996 following the 1995 rape incident, as saying that local anti-base politicians were exaggerating the importance of these molestation cases for their own anti-American purposes and that "the crime rate among the Marines was not unusually high."

This widely reported comment greatly irritated many Okinawans. On January 15, the municipal assembly of the city of Nago, where Japan and the U.S. want to move Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, voted unanimously to demand a reduction of Marine Corps personnel in Okinawa as the only feasible solution to the endless chain of incidents. The mayor of Kin village, where Camp Hansen is located, was particularly angry. He had worked hard with Anderson when he was there to try to maintain discipline among the 7,000 young Marines and regarded the colonel's comments as a personal betrayal.

On January 19, all forty-eight members of the Okinawan Prefectural Assembly voted for a resolution that for the first time called on the U.S. forces and the central government "to reduce the presence of the U.S. forces, including the Marine Corps."39 Some LDP members were at first reluctant to support the resolution but in the end argued that "the population in the prefecture will not be satisfied unless we call for a reduction in the Marine Corps." Governor Inamine also went along, declaring to the Prefectural Assembly on February 22 that "I will ask the central government to move to reduce the U.S. armed forces."40 According to Toriyama Tadashi of the Yomiuri Shimbun, he did so in part because Richard Armitage had been appointed deputy secretary of state in the new Bush administration and on the basis of the so-called Armitage Report he believed that Armitage was receptive to lowering the numbers of Marines in Okinawa.41

Hailston's Blunder

Understandably frustrated by these developments but also reflecting the Herodian arrogance of American proconsuls assigned to what they view as a backwater of the empire, Marine Lt. Gen. Earl Hailston, the senior U.S. military officer on Okinawa, now proceeded to generate a political firestorm. On January 23, 2001, five days after the Prefectural Assembly's unanimous resolution, Gen. Hailston sent a private e-mail to his thirteen most senior subordinates, calling for much greater attention to discipline. But apparently reflecting his irritation, he also wrote, "They [Inamine, the vice-governors, the mayor of Kin, and the conservative members of the legislature] stood idly by as the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly passed a resolution. I think they are all nuts and a bunch of wimps."42 This e-mail was leaked to the Ryukyu Shimpo and soon the Japanese words that the press chose for "nuts" (atama ga warui, "bad heads") and "wimps" (koshinuke, "milksops, chicken-hearted," or yowamushi, "mollycoddles, cry-babies") adorned every newspaper in Japan.

Of course, Gen. Hailston apologized, first by faxed letter and then after being told that a mere fax was impolite, in person. Governor Inamine did not hesitate to show his irritation and refused to shake hands. Even the American Consul in Naha, Timothy Betts, indirectly criticized Hailston, saying that "It is incorrect to think that the view expressed by Lt. Gen. Hailston is the same as that held by the United States."43 The assemblies of the cities of Okinawa, Ishikawa, and Chatan, all located next door to major military installations, passed resolutions asking the U.S. to replace Gen. Hailston, but the Pentagon refused, saying that he had already apologized. In response to the calls that Hailston be fired, Rear Adm. Paul Schultz, commander of the U.S.'s Amphibious Group One based in Okinawa and Sasebo, got into the act and argued that "We should be very careful about calling for somebody's resignation who provides the level of support he does for this country."44 This struck many Okinawans as more evidence that the Americans did not know they were guests in someone else's country and that they considered Okinawa as either the fifty-first state or a suburb of Hawaii.

Hailston's gaffe, although barely reported in the United States, did not occur in a vacuum in Japan and Okinawa. It coincided exactly with the sinking on February 9, 2001, of the Japanese fisheries training vessel Ehime Maru by the U.S. nuclear attack submarine, U.S.S. Greeneville. This serious accident grew into a major bone of contention between the United States and Japan when it was revealed that the Greeneville was at sea that day only to give a ride to some sixteen civilians the Navy was trying to cultivate.45 Other festering issues that are poisoning Japan-American relations and that constitute particular grievances for the Okinawans include the following.

(1) The U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the formal treaty that governs the legal status of American troops in Japan, has not been modified since 1960 and is wildly at odds with similar agreements that exists between NATO and Germany and between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. This issue was exacerbated in February 2001 when the Japanese charged a Marine lance corporal with burning down a half-dozen bars and food stalls in Chatan, and the U.S. refused to turn him over to Japanese authorities because arson is not considered a heinous offense as specified in the SOFA. Governors of all thirteen prefectures where U.S. troops are stationed have petitioned to have the SOFA formally revised, but the Japanese and American governments have refused to do so, fearing that the process of revision could prove uncontrollable. As Rachel Cornwell and Andrew Wells put it, "Most SOFAs are written so that national courts cannot exercise legal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel who commit crimes against local people, except in special cases where the U.S. military authorities agree to transfer jurisdiction."46

(2) The proposed new airport for the Marines at Nago poses a direct threat to the habitat of the dugong, an endangered sea mammal that Japan has designated a national treasure. The World Conservation Congress, an international organization supported by the Japanese government, at its meeting in Amman, Jordan, October 4-11, 2000, called on the Japanese and American governments to save the dugong and to protect the coral reefs and sea-grass beds on which it depends. The U.S. military's indifference to this issue also inflames Japanese nationalists, who note that the U.S. employs domestic American laws to save whales, which some Japanese like to eat, but is quite prepared to sacrifice Japan's dugongs.47

(3) In 1995 and 1996, the U.S. Marines fired 1,520 rounds of depleted uranium (DU) ammunition into Torishima, one of the Ryukyu Islands, but did not tell anyone about their potential health hazards for over a year. In May 2000, Brig. Gen. James Smith, commander of the 18th Air Wing at Kadena Air Force Base, acknowledged that DU ammunition was stored at Kadena but said that none of the aircraft that might use it are based in Okinawa. Even when two hundred spent DU shell-casings turned up in a Nishihara, Okinawa junkyard, no one in the U.S. government took any interest. However, when the NATO nations revealed that twenty-four European soldiers who had served in Kosovo had died of cancer and that the 30,000 rounds of DU ammunition that were fired there were the probable cause of these deaths, the Japanese press reacted angrily. The Yomiuri asked editorially, "Who Needs Such Weapons.?"48

(4) In a visit to Okinawa in September 2000, Gen. James Jones, the Marine Corps commandant, said in an interview with the Okinawa Times that he certainly intended to base the Marines' new V-22 Osprey tilt-wing aircraft at Futenma or at the new airport in Nago whenever it is built. In so doing he set off a major panic. The Okinawan press has reported extensively on the Osprey's notorious record of crashes and on the U.S.'s on-going investigation of high-ranking Marine officers for falsifying maintenance records on the Osprey in order to get Congress to fund full production. Many Okinawans noted that Futenma is already at extreme risk for crashes that would kill or harm civilians and that the Osprey, which has so far killed twenty-three Marines, would only add to this threat. The mayor of Nago, Kishimoto Tateo, an ally of Inamine's, said that "We must not expose our people to danger. We will not accept anything that will be a safety risk."49

It is impossible to predict how these complex issues will be resolved. But it is obvious what should happen. The United States should convert its treaties in East Asia into equitable state-to-state alliances without any permanent American military presence. This should be done for the following two reasons: (1) the forward-deployed American forces have themselves become militarily provocative and one of the main source of instability in the area; and (2) the moral consequences of the American military enclaves are destroying any basis of future trust and cooperation among the peoples involved. The Cold War is finally winding down in East Asia, just as it ended in Europe over a decade ago. The United States should dismantle its satellites in East Asia in an orderly manner before they rise up against the United States, as the former Soviet Union's satellites did in Eastern Europe.
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NOTES

1. For details, see Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), pp. 74-84.

2. See Nicholas Berry, "Is China an Aggressive Power?" The Defense Monitor, 29:9 (November 2000): 1-5.

3. See the interview with Marine Maj. Gen. Henry Stackpole, then the overall commander of U.S. forces in Okinawa, in the Washington Post, March 27, 1990. Gen. Stackpole dreamed up this excuse for his forces' presence in Japan in order to try to save the Third Marine Division from a Department of Defense proposal to demobilize it as no longer needed.

4. See Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, "East Asian Security: The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy," Foreign Affairs 74:4 (July/August 1995): 103-114.

5. See, inter alia, "Special Issue on the Asian Crisis," Cambridge Journal of Economics 22:6 (November 1998); George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1999); Nancy Viviani, "Australia-Indonesia Relations After the East Timor Upheaval," Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper No. 64 (January 2000); and "East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community: Resistance, Repression, and Responsibility," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 32:1 and 2 (2000), particularly pp. 43-47, "U.S. Support for the Indonesian Military: Congressional Testimony."

6. The best treatment of this subject is Ota Masahide, Minukui Nihonjin: Nihon no Okinawa ishiki (Ugly Japanese: Japan's Consciousness of Okinawa) (Tokyo: Simul Press, 1995).

7. Quoted in Robert V. Hamilton, "`Selling' the U.S. Military Presence in Japan," Marine Corps Gazette, November 2000, pp. 58-60.

8. Calvin Sims, "A Hard Life for Amerasian Children," New York Times, July 23, 2000.

9. See also Okinawa Times, eve. ed., June 21, 2000; and Valerie Reitman, "Creating a School for Okinawa's Biracial Children," Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2000.

10. Among many sources, see, in particular, Haruna Mikio, "The Reality of Forty Years of the Japanese-American Security Treaty," Sekai, December 1999, pp. 74-86; "Foreign Ministry Must Unveil Secret Deals Between Japan and the U.S. Regarding the 1960 Security Treaty," Asahi Shimbun, February 11, 2000; "Secret Documents on U.S.'s Introduction of Nuclear Weapons," Yomiuri Shimbun, April 14, 2000; "Okinawa Reversion: U.S. Archives Endorse `Secret Deals' and `Burdens' in Military, Economic Areas," Mainichi Shimbun, May 30, 2000; "Okinawa Reversion to Japan Was at Japan's Expense Based on Secret Arrangement with U.S.," Japan Press Weekly, No. 2191, June 17, 2000, pp. 11-14; "The Entire Picture Exposed of Secret Deals Behind the Cover of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty," front page, and the article by Honda Masaru, p. 3, Asahi Shimbun, August 30, 2000 (all articles are in Japanese).

11. Miyagi Etsujiro, "Okinawa's 20th Reversion Anniversary," Japan Quarterly, April-June 1992, pp. 146-58.

12. For a portrait of the disillusionment, see Norma Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor (New York: Pantheon, 1991), pp. 33-104. For arguments against reversion and in favor of Okinawan independence, see Taira Koji, Nihonkoku kaizo shiron (Essays on the Reform of the Japanese State) (Tokyo: Kodansha Gendai Shinsho, 1974).

13. Kinjo Hideo, in Okinawa Times, July 23, 2000.

14. Ota details the inside story of his own election in Okinawa no ketsudan (Okinawa's Decisions) (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 2000), pp. 107-51.

15. See Robert D. Eldrige, "The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on U.S. Base Reductions: One Question, Several Answers," Asian Survey 37:10 (October 1997): 879-904.

16. Details of these and other Okinawan protests during the Ota era can be found in Chalmers Johnson, ed., Okinawa: Cold War Island (Cardiff, Calif.: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999).

17. "Follow-up of SACO Final Report on Okinawa Base Reductions; Implementation List `Padded Out';' Actual Land Return Only in One Case," Tokyo Shimbun, August 8, 2000.

18. Japan Press Weekly, No. 2196, July 22, 2000, p. 10.

19. Julia Yonetani, "On the Battlefield of Mabuni: Struggles Over Peace and the Past in Contemporary Okinawa," East Asian History, No. 20, December 2000, p. 167.

20. Hayano Toru, Asahi Shimbun, January 11, 2000.

21. Katsura Teijiro, Asahi Shimbun, December 8, 2000.

22. Gregg Jones, "U.S. Bases in Okinawa Teeter on the Political Edge," Dallas Morning News, December 30, 1998.

23. Gabe Masaaki, "Futenma Air Station: The Okinawa Problem in Japan-U.S. Relations," Japan Echo, June 2000, p. 19.

24. Mainichi Shimbun, March 7, 2001. On the Foreign Ministry's secret slush funds, see David T. Johnson, "Bureaucratic Corruption in Japan," Japan Policy Research Institute, Working Paper No. 76 (April 2001).

25. On the "tropical Alcatraz," see Gavan McCormack and Julia Yonetani, "The Okinawan Summit Seen from Below," Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper No. 71 (September 2000).

26. Pacific Stars & Stripes, July 24, 2000.

27. See Julia Yonetani, East Asian History, and the article and photograph of Ota visiting one of the sanitized museum exhibitions in Shukan Asahi, April 28, 2000.

28. Ota, "My Thoughts on Okinawa as Host," Japan Times, July 20, 2000.

29. Asahi Shimbun, November 14, 2000; Pacific Stars & Stripes, November 18, 2000.

30. Yomiuri Shimbun, February 12, 14, 2001.

31. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, "The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership," INSS Special Report, October 11, 2000. For the extensive Japanese reporting on the "Armitage Report," see Funabashi Yoichi in the Asahi Shimbun, October 19, 2000; Yomiuri Shimbun, December 31, 2000; and Sankei Shimbun, January 17, 2000. Also see Steven C. Clemons, "The Armitage Report: Reading Between the Lines," Japan Policy Research Institute Occasional Paper No. 20 (February 2001); and Nicholas Berry, Center for Defense Information, "Bad Bipartisan Advice on U.S.-Japan Security Relations," on line at .

32. Kurt M. Campbell, "Energizing the U.S.-Japan Security Partnership," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2000, p. 126.

33. Kinjo Hideo, "The U.S. Military Base Issue in Okinawa, "Okinawa Times, July 23, 2000.

34. On the failings of the Japanese press, see Ikeda Tatsuo, "Gap Between Okinawa's Local Assembly Resolutions for U.S. Marine Cuts and Media Reports," Mainichi Shimbun, January 30, 2001.

35. On prosecutors' reports and indictments of U.S. military personnel, see "Crimes by U.S. Servicemen Last Year Reach 627, Largest Number Since 1991," Yomiuri Shimbun, August 16, 2000; and Asahi Shimbun, January 30, 2001, p. 32. On the gonorrhea problem, see Pacific Stars & Stripes, October 2, 2000.

36. Calvin Sims, "Marines Apologize to Okinawa Over Sex Case," New York Times, July 7, 2000; Pacific Stars & Stripes, July 25, 2000.

37. "Japanese Police Seek Molestation Charges Against 3 Marines," Los Angeles Times, January 6, 2001.

38. "Marine Arrested, Obscenity Charge," Ryukyu Shimpo, January 22, 2001.

39. "Okinawa: U.S. Marine's Molestation Incident," Asahi Shimbun, January 30, 2001.

40. "On the Presence of U.S. Forces in Okinawa, Governor Inamine Says `I Will Ask the Central Government to Reduce Armed Forces,'" Mainichi Shimbun, February 23, 2001.

41. Toriyama Tadashi, "Okinawa Steps Up Demands," Yomiuri Shimbun, March 8, 2001.

42. "Governor, Others Nuts and Wimps," Ryukyu Shimpo, February 6, 2001; "Chief of U.S. Forces in Okinawa Calls Governor `Nuts and Wimps' in E-mail Critical of Assembly Resolution Calling for Reduction of U.S. Marines," Asahi Shimbun, February 6, 2001, eve. ed.

43, "Consul General in Okinawa Apologizes for U.S. General's E-mail Flap," Okinawa Times, February 7, 2001.

44. Jan Wesner Childs, "Lt. Gen. Hailston Apologizes in Face-to-face Meeting with Governor," Pacific Stars & Stripes, February 10, 2001.

45. During 1999, the U.S.'s Pacific Fleet had taken some 11,674 civilian guests on trips on surface ships, submarines, and aircraft carriers. See Nora Zamichow and Tony Perry, "Putting Zip Into VIP's Sub Rides," Los Angeles Times, February 16, 2001.

46. Rachel Cornwell and Andrew Wells, "Deploying Insecurity" Peace Review 11:3 (1999): 410. Also see Sentaku, March 2001; Okinawa Times, June 15, 2000; and David Allen, "Okinawa Wants Changes in Procedure for Turning Over Accused Servicemembers," Pacific Stars & Stripes, February 18, 2001.

47. "Dugong Support Group Plans to Fight U.S. Marines in Court," Asahi Evening News, November 19, 2000; and Asahi Shimbun, March 8, 2001.

48. "Who Needs Such Weapons that Use Depleted Uranium Ammunition?" Yomiuri Shimbun, January 14, 2001. Also see Mark Oliva, "Depleted Uranium Stores Anger Japanese," Pacific Stars & Stripes, May 27, 2000; David Allen, "Disposed Depleted Uranium Casings Proving a Headache for AF in Okinawa," Pacific Stars & Stripes, June 2 2000; and Marlise Simons, "Doctor's Gulf War Studies Link Cancer to Depleted Uranium," New York Times, January 29, 2001.

49. "Top Marine Visits Okinawa," Okinawa Times, September 30, 2000, eve. ed.; "Fears on Advent of Ospreys," Ryukyu Shimpo, December 14, 2000; and Steven Lee Myers, "Marine Unit Raided in Criminal Inquiry on Troubled Craft," New York Times, January 19, 2001.

Chalmers Johnson is president of the Japan Policy Research Institute, a tax-exempt nonprofit educational and research organization. He is the author of Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Holt Metropolitan Books, 2000) and editor of Okinawa: Cold War Island (Cardiff, Calif.: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999).


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