

STRAIT TALK BERKELEY CONSENSUS DOCUMENT

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Part I

Consensus Document English Original

1 Introduction

Mainland China has long aspired to restore the historical territorial integrity of their nation through a reintegration of Taiwan. The Taiwanese, in the meantime, have undergone a distinct experience of nation-building and developed a unique character of its own which they feel would be lost through integration into the mainland. The historical trends resulted in the current cross-Strait political impasse to which both sides have yet to devise a mutually acceptable solution.

In this context, the sustained interest of the United States in seeking long-term stability in cross-Strait relations and in the larger Asia-Pacific context has a vital role to play, especially given the complex nature of its relationship with both sides of the Strait.

This report contains the results of our weeklong Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) dialogue, a process that brought together concerned individuals from the different sides of this conflict to jointly analyze its roots, explore possible solutions, and build sustainable relationships.

Our team consists of fifteen young civil society members, five from Mainland China, five from Taiwan, and five from the United States. Following a highly interactive, experiential method of dialogue for joint exploration, and by maintaining a consistently empathetic understanding of the humanity of all parties involved, we have developed a series of ideas, which we hope can facilitate solutions to the cross-Strait issue.

Our work has centered on an analytical approach to the problem from multiple perspectives. We have attempted to distill the cross-Strait issue to the basic human needs each party perceives to be in jeopardy, and then put these seemingly contradictory needs into a set of three open-ended, exploratory questions that invite creative responses. We present here the results of our collaborative effort to answer these “dilemma questions.” It must be emphasized that while the dilemma questions served as a starting point to our reflections and explorations, our answers have since developed and they go beyond the limited scope of the questions. We also note that what this report contains is the consensus among all the fifteen participants; a number of ideas on which we could not reach consensus had to be left out despite their potential for further discussion we hope to continue in other settings.

This consensus document discusses the cross-Strait relations from three distinct perspectives. The first is from the perspective of culture and identity. This includes Mainland China’s desire to preserve its holistic territory, as well as the high value that the Taiwanese place on their identity as a unique, independent entity. In this section, we present ideas to bridge these different collective mindsets through methods ranging from cultural exchanges to improved official collaboration that honor both shared and distinct historical legacies between the two sides of the Strait.

The second perspective is one of politics and security. The central contradiction we approach

in this section is between the Mainland's desire to establish administrative control of Taiwan on the one hand, and Taiwan's aspiration to retain autonomous control of its own political future on the other. In this section, we describe methods to build up mutual trust, by means such as improving bilateral communication, fiscal arrangements, and devising political agreements to overcome the contradiction.

Finally, the third approach we have taken is to view the cross-Strait conflict as a trilateral challenge that Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States share. Despite significant suspicion and mistrust on both sides of the Strait, we believe there is much room for cooperation, especially in the fields of economics and security, which can lead to greater regional stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. In this report, we explore possible ways to realize this prosperity such as through the establishment of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), the facilitation of increased interaction between private parties, and a number of institutional arrangements designed to build mutual understanding and regional confidence.

Our ability to formulate this consensus document with the inclusion of such a wide range of perspectives represents a unique accomplishment in itself, but it is an accomplishment on which we hope to continue to build, and on which we hope others will build as well. Our goal is to not only illustrate the value of these types of in-depth dialogues and collaborative efforts, but also to highlight the potential long-term benefits that may be derived from the results. We aim to suggest a framework for future, larger-scale efforts to facilitate understanding and peace in the region. Readers should view this report as the results of international collaboration, a vision for a peaceful future, and above all, a call for action.

2 Social Identity in Cross-Strait Relations

How can Mainland China and Taiwan reduce prejudices and obtain mutual understanding as Taiwan preserves its identity as a distinct entity while Mainland China aspires to forge a holistic unity?

This question delves into the heart of why Mainland China and Taiwan have forged fundamentally different collective identities over the years. The inherent contradiction between the Mainland's desire to reclaim its unity, and Taiwan's wish to maintain its status as a distinct political entity has largely contributed to the divergence of their perceived identities. These contrasting perceptions resonated profoundly with the delegates throughout this symposium. Bearing this in mind, we suggest that both sides of the Strait work to bridge these gaps by providing an array of historical views across the Strait in the educational setting, by employing the power of media to enhance mutual understanding, by developing cross-Strait cultural festivals to showcase unique identities, and by exploring the possibilities of future coexistence and cohesion.

By suggesting these measures, we wish to reconstruct a sense of shared identity between Mainland China and Taiwan, and at the same time, stress the importance of maintaining the unique identity that Taiwanese people hold dear. Upon a successful implementation of these aforementioned policies both parties may be more inclined to reconcile their different interpretations of history and establish mutual

trust.

2.1 Building Appreciation of Identity through Education

Considering that education plays a central role in shaping and changing collective mindsets, we believe it can be an efficient channel to help Mainland China and Taiwan realize their commonalities and differences in identity.

We have experienced through our weeklong dialogue how cultural upbringing can influence perceptions of inherited history and affect the formation of identities. Therefore, the idea of reviewing the past through multiple perspectives becomes of vital importance in shaping our identity perceptions towards more mutual understanding. [See appendix for “walk through history” experiment]

We suggest that academics from both sides of the Strait cooperate to produce supplemental materials to history textbooks, in which different perspectives on history will be presented. The goal of this proposed initiative is to spur in the two societies’ awareness of the distinct historical experiences and interpretations, and facilitate future dialogue for sustainable coexistence. Drawing on lessons from the joint China-Japan-Korea project in 2002, an effort to supplement official mainstream textbooks with books that feature a common history of all three countries, one can discern that a greater understanding of history from alternative, even conflicting vantage can enhance mutual understanding.

We also propose to develop and promote an interdisciplinary program on cross-Strait relations involving a multitude of academic institutions and students of higher education in Mainland China and Taiwan. By thoughtfully sharing and discussing each side’s respective histories and values, students can attain a more comprehensive understanding of their distinct identities. The program will specifically invite leading scholars from both sides of the Strait in the departments of history, sociology, politics, and other relevant disciplines to collaborate in academic research and eventually the creation of a curriculum that will enable students to better understand the complexities of the relationship.

Both sides of the Strait should discuss mutual funding options. These may include offering a scholarship to the students based on a previous agreement, providing incentives for leading scholars to participate, etc. The publicity of such programs will be openly and explicitly exposed to the scholars. Above all, we believe that the program should be considered as a safe-zone where scholars will not be discriminated by any government for the expression of their thoughts and beliefs, as we feel this would counter the mainstream projection of identity in both sides of the Strait.

2.2 Correcting Prejudice and Misunderstanding through Media

The lack of reliable information between the two entities is major obstacle that hinders reconciliation. The consumption of media is a social experience that influences the collective mindsets. Therefore, we advocate for the use of media such as television to reduce prejudices and promote mutual understanding between Mainland China and Taiwan. In order to achieve this, we propose

to create a new media outlet that will balance both the Mainland's drive to create a holistic society and Taiwan's aspiration to preserve its unique identity. This project will entail a production team that includes professionals from both sides of the Strait as a means of ensuring a fair exchange of different perspectives and methods of media consumption. This will consequently enable the outlet to deliver fair and truthful information as well as entertainment, to the public across both sides of the Strait.

Considering the long term benefits of maintaining an open environment that can accommodate exchanges among professionals of Mainland China and Taiwan, the media outlet will run a multi-partisan television network that features an array of contrasting ideas and perceptions. Professionals from both sides of the Strait would represent the values of both entities as defined by their own culture perspective and respect differences in conceptions of identity.

We also advocate for the joint production of news, which will entail creating an editorial leadership comprised of journalists from both sides of the Strait. These professionals will collect, verify and disseminate information to the general public in a fair and respectful yet critical manner, and provide relevant analysis through an objective and well-informed manner.

In terms of entertainment media, we propose that network airs both local programs from Mainland China and Taiwan, as well as new programs produced by the network. The airing of programs originating from both entities can provide authentic insight into the popular cultures of both entities. The new programs can highlight everyday experiences of interactions between people from both sides of the Strait. Doing this will provide a space for both sides of the Strait to appreciate their identities and the possibilities of coexistence.

It is important to also establish a neutral media monitoring committee that will preserve the outlet's impartiality. Committee members will consist of both experts and private citizens from both sides of the Strait to ensure a balanced portrayal of identity perceptions. In addition, we propose that the network's funding should largely derive from both entities. Any further funding by the government, business, or the public should be transparent and accessible to the public, so as to maintain its credibility among the masses.

2.3 Embracing Identity through Cultural Exchange

We propose to initiate cultural festivals that embrace both Taiwan's unique identity and Mainland China's aspiration to maintain its holistic society. The festivals should provide an open space that encourages the discussion of cultural identity among people of both sides of the Strait. By doing this, people will not only learn about the differences that distinguish their diverse cultures, but discover their common elements as well.

Cultural festivals should be held to exchange different cultural facets. We believe that a food festival would serve this purpose, because food is one manifestation of cultural characteristics among the easiest to share with others. Food festivals may create a common ground among people from both sides of the Strait, and it can foster greater appreciation of uniqueness of both societies. There have been several food festivals held across the Strait, with chefs hailing from both Mainland

China and Taiwan bringing unique dishes that best represent their gastronomy. We propose to further promote this practice and suggest that cities in both sides of the Strait take turns to hold such events, to provide an open space of cultural expression.

Dialogue of cross-Strait cultures should be constructed regularly to preserve and appreciate the cultural heritages of both sides. Cultural identities may change over time, so dialogues that involve people from both sides of the Strait should be organized as a means of clarifying common ground and differences. Meanwhile, cultural symbols like anthems, flags, and languages should be respected and recorded because they are prime examples of cultural identity.

3 Political Aspects of Cross-Strait Relations

For the security of both sides across the Strait, how can Mainland China seek administrative control over Taiwan as its legitimate territory while Taiwan stays autonomous and preserves the freedom of its society?

For the past several decades, lack of understanding and insufficient communication have caused instabilities in cross-Strait relations. Claiming Taiwan as its legitimate territory, Mainland China regards cross-Strait reunification to be an essential part of its core interests: stability and prosperity. Therefore, Mainland China considers any attempt towards *de jure* independence of Taiwan as a threat to its core existence. Meanwhile, Taiwan's search for greater autonomy has deep roots from its unique history and hard-earned democratic values. Taiwan thus considers its autonomy and freedom to be its fundamental interests.

As cross-Strait communication has increased in recent years, we believe we have also seen an increase in the potential for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue. Considering the current situation, the delegates present the following proposal covering two aspects: confidence-building initiatives and possible governance frameworks. We propose to set up communication channels to connect policy makers from both sides of the Strait and programs at a larger scale that promote the bilateral flow of administrative personnel. With confidence accumulating and comprehension deepening, two potential cross-Strait governance frameworks merit further discussion. Fundamentals of this framework include the acceptance of a non-aggression pact across the Strait, an initiative to ensure the autonomy of each side's fiscal and monetary systems, and an in-depth discussion on the future of cross-Strait political relations.

3.1 Confidence-Building Measures for Cross-Strait Stability

We acknowledge that mutual understanding and direct communication between senior leaders of both sides of the Strait are key factors in maintaining stability for both sides. Hence, we suggest establishing informal communication channels such as Interactive Conflict Resolution sessions (ICR), where senior officials from both sides would participate as individual citizens without representing their respective entities, in order for the discussion to stay open and genuine. These sessions will provide a promising platform for participants to jointly discuss, analyze and seek solutions to issues in cross-Strait relations. Additionally, we envision the possibility to develop short-term political exchange programs for government officials from both sides to exchange their

political insights and perspectives. Participants would observe the political practices of the other side and build up trust and confidence setting the basis for further cooperation.

3.2 Cross-Strait Governance Framework

We recognize the political impasse of the cross-Strait relations and express our willingness to discuss possible future political governance framework. Our greatest hope is that both entities consider the following issues as essential prerequisites for engaging in a discussion about political framework.

First, we advocate for the adoption of a non-aggression agreement for cross-Strait security. Second, we suggest that both governments initiate or continue discussions to ensure the autonomy and control of each's fiscal and monetary systems. Acknowledging the democratization efforts of the Chinese government, Strait Talk delegates from Taiwan appeal for the continuation of such efforts to show its good will and benign intentions, which are of great concerns of Taiwanese people.

With the above principles, we wish to propose two possible scenarios of the political governing structure of cross-Strait relations. The first proposition is to establish a unique political arrangement drawing inspirations from various precedents of Commonwealth systems. The two sides would reserve full administrative autonomy in this process. The basis for this political system will be a jointly-drafted constitution ratified by each party, that stands above the their current constitutions, which will guarantee that each member's territorial integrity and governance autonomy will be safeguarded.

Upon the eventual development of a stable and matured Commonwealth system, both sides could consider the possibility of constructing a federal framework, in which Taiwan will be a member. As a constituent entity of this federal system, Taiwan will enjoy equal rights as other members. As we understand that such a federal system will require more cohesion of both sides than the Commonwealth system, we see it as a idea worth dwelling into to explore future possibilities in a bolder way.

4 Cross-Strait Relations and the United States

How can the United States, Mainland China, and Taiwan improve their trilateral relationship and provide stability in the Asia-Pacific through economic and security cooperation despite different perspectives on identity and national interests?

In the past few decades, we have witnessed a positive evolution in the relationship between the United States, Mainland China and Taiwan. However, mistrust and suspicion remain. The peaceful rise of China has brought new dynamics to cross-Strait relationship on the one hand, and China-United States relationship on the other. The United States' "pivot to Asia" policy and Taiwan's search for greater autonomy add to the complexity of these trends. The result is a series of challenges which cause tensions and division in the region.

Despite the differences and mistrust between these parties, there is considerable room for cooperation on economic and security issues in which all parties benefit. Specifically, we believe that economic cooperation between Mainland China and Taiwan can lead to cooperative regional integration, which will lead to better relations and stability in East Asia. We also believe that there is room for institution-building between these three parties that will help improve cooperation and solve disputes. Both sides of the Strait as well as the United States should begin dialogues on arms reductions high-level exchanges, and cooperation on non-military matters such as disaster relief and humanitarian aid. Lastly, we urge the establishment of a transnational think tank to discuss cross-Strait issues and deepen mutual understanding between all stakeholders. Cooperation on these issues can lead to greater regional integration, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific.

4.1 Economic Relations and Balance

The Asia-Pacific is a highly integrated region and engine of global economic growth. It is in the interest of all economies involved including the United States, to maintain the stability in the region as a basis to further economic prosperity, enhance welfare and strengthen the basis for sustained regional peace and stability.

We advocate economic cooperation as a way towards enhanced prosperity for all parties involved. Deepened economic integration through balanced and well-managed economic cooperation will enable both Taiwan and Mainland China to take advantage of global supply chains and emerging markets in Asia-Pacific and beyond, including the United States. Further comprehensive trade agreements in the Asia Pacific area should be encouraged to facilitate commercial links, provided that such agreements are conducted in a respectful and responsible manner that accommodates for the structural specificities of each economic party.

For instance, Mainland China and Taiwan can use their respective advantages in production factors, technology and market structure towards more efficient allocation and use of economic resources. We propose that both sides of the Taiwan Strait take steps for complementary cooperation, such as by establishing new Special Economic Zones (SEZ) that might combine the Mainland's abundant labor and capital with Taiwan's high-technology capacities, which will further attract investment and exchange from abroad. The shared goal of fostering economic prosperity in the region will be reinforced by attracting increased number of international businesses to Taiwan and Mainland China, which will also help the region to diversify its activities and sources of capital, and achieve distinct but intertwined and better-balanced development.

While we advocate economic cooperation and balanced regional integration as a basis for enhanced prosperity and stability, we also stress caution towards the risks of unbalanced trade flows or over-dependency of one economy on another. Hence, economic policy should seek diversification and prevent excessive dependency and structural trade imbalances.

4.2 Institutional Arrangement for Regional Stability

Considering that tension frequently arises in the Asia Pacific region because of the contested security goals of the stakeholders involved, there is an urgent need to enhance institutional arrangements for regional security.

We understand that the existing trends of militarization across the Taiwan Strait and in the broader regional context are unsustainable in the long run. To reverse these trends, it is important for leaders on all sides to define their security needs, social responsibilities, and regulations to prevent a further escalation of tension. The vision of regional demilitarization we advocate is especially relevant for Mainland China and the United States to consider, for they are the two parties that must develop frameworks for reducing tensions with regard to military presence. These steps, if taken, will signal a shared commitment to regional confidence-building and the creation of an environment conducive to deeper integration.

In order to mitigate the risk involved in such a change in the status quo, all parties should explore the possibility of demilitarizing the areas across the Strait in a gradual and phased manner. This should begin with frank and honest discussion on possible scenarios as well as conditions which may support the demilitarization process. In this process, all parties, especially the United States and Mainland China, should consider logistical arrangements for conducting joint military exercises. These collateral efforts are useful especially in a context of emerging security threats such as terrorism, piracy and environmental hazards.

We propose to establish an intergovernmental forum capable of accommodating Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States. This trilateral mechanism will provide a space for officials from relevant agencies of the three sides to have open, candid discussion on their security concerns. Other relevant regional parties and stakeholders hoping to reach mutual security consensus with Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States will also be invited if appropriate. Gradual inclusion of new parties will be built on consensus between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and the United States.

4.3 Informal Channels for Relationship Building

Considering the current difficulty in building official relationships among the three parties, we suggest expanding a range of alternative channels through which they can directly communicate and build confidence. Actors which may promote these channels of communication include civil society groups, non-governmental organizations, private citizens, business communities, education and research institutions.

Such alternative channels would facilitate partnerships at the municipal level. Partnerships between major economic and cultural centers of the three societies will facilitate multi-track diplomacy that humanizes the relationships between them. These alternative channels of communication would enable mainstream dialogue on transnational challenges such as pollution and climate change, which official channels as of yet have been unable to address fully.

The sustained instability in the Asia Pacific region is attributed in part to the lack of credible, accessible information. To expand the collective capacity of the region to produce reliable analysis of the political, economic, and security issues that concern Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States, we propose establishing a cross-Strait think tank to which all three societies contribute in terms of funding and personnel. Contributions by other regional stakeholder communities or individual experts will also be needed. As a trusted forum and hub of high-quality research and dialogue, the think tank will provide timely analysis on diverse challenges concerning cross-Strait and Asia-Pacific relations and bring together opinion leaders from all sides to formulate common frameworks to tackle the challenges. Furthermore, the proposed think tank will serve as a clearinghouse for educational institutions and media professionals seeking innovative approaches to public awareness-building and dialogue.

5 Conclusion

The question of how to reconcile the relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan is one of the most challenging and important political issues in the Asia-Pacific region. The contradiction between Mainland China's desire to restore its historical unity and Taiwan's desire to maintain a unique and independent identity remains at the center of the cross-Strait political impasse. In this document, our goal has been to establish a series of suggestions capable of bridging the differences in collective mindsets, and maximizing the satisfaction of all sides, ultimately creating a stable and prosperous regional peace.

We have provided diverse examples of specific recommendations ranging from cross-cultural festivals and student exchange programs to the development of mutually acceptable fiscal and monetary arrangements and peace agreements. Our collaborative effort to develop possible solutions has been informed by our desire to transform conflict and to honor the humanity of all sides. Our aim is to build the foundation of trust and friendship necessary to establish an atmosphere conducive to the development of mutually acceptable solutions.

This consensus ICR document is intended not to be a definitive solution to the cross-Strait issue by itself, but to demonstrate that it is possible for dialogue participants from Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States to work together to meet the underlying needs of all sides involved. And ultimately, we hope that our dialogue can serve as a model for how the problem may be solved on a larger scale. While this document is a result of our thorough analysis of the past, it ultimately represents our vision of a peaceful future.

We hope that readers will view the contents of this report not only as a representation of trilateral consensus, but more importantly as a call to action. We believe that our experience in collectively assembling the potential solutions contained in this document is proof that taking a decisive step to resolve the cross-Strait problem is possible, but it will require an active commitment and participation of all sides.

Part II

共同宣言大陆简体中文译本

6 绪言

中国大陆长期以来希冀通过统一台湾，维护其历史领土完整。与此同时，台湾民众构建了独特的国族认同，形成了独有的民族性格，且认为与大陆的统一会让自己丧失此民族性格。“一切历史都是当代史”¹，两地各自经历及书写的历史相互影响，并作用于当下。而由此引发的两岸政治困局，至今未获双方皆可接受的解决方案。

于此背景下，作为第三方的美国，因与中国大陆及台湾的关系，以及在海峡两岸及亚太地区长期稳定发展中的收益，所持立场对两岸关系有重要影响。此宣言记录我们在“互动式冲突解决会谈”（Interactive Conflict Resolution, ICR）中，持续对话一周的结果。此过程中，来自各方关注两岸议题的代表们相聚讨论，共同分析冲突之源头、探索可能的解决方案，并建立长久的友谊。

我们的团队由关心两岸议题的十五位青年学子组成，其中五人来自中国大陆，五人来自台湾，五人来自美国。我们在充满互动及体验性的对话中共同探索，本着对各方参与者人性的同情及理解，最终提出一系列建议，希望它们有助于两岸问题的解决。我们着重多视角的问题分析，试图提炼出陆、台、美三方，各自认为己方在两岸冲突中受威胁的“人性基本需求”（Basic Human Needs），并将这些看似无法兼容的需求，呈现在三个具有开放性及探索性的问题中，继而在此基础上寻求创新的解答。以下为我们对这三个“悖论问题”共同寻得的解答。惟须强调，这三个问题仅为激发我们思索的跳板，最后形成的回答其实已超出原本问题的范畴。此外，为使此宣言成为我们十五人之共识，我们不得不将某些缺乏一致认同，但具有进一步讨论空间的想法暂且舍去。

本共同宣言从三个不同层面探讨两岸关系。一是文化与身份认同，包括中国大陆保持领土完整的夙愿，及台湾民众对自身独特身份的认同，及其作为独立实体之状态的高度珍视。在此章节，我们提出促进文化交流，强化官方合作等一系列建议，希望两岸以求同存异的态度面对历史遗产，架起连结两方集体心态的桥梁。

第二个层面是政治与安全，它的主要矛盾源于大陆管治台湾的强烈意愿，以及台湾保有其政治自治的希求。在此章节，我们将说明如何借由增进双方沟通、确保财政自主及达成政治协议的方式，消弭对立，培养互信。

第三个层面将两岸冲突视为中国大陆、台湾，美国三方共同面临的挑战。尽管两岸对现状充满疑虑，我们相信双方仍有广阔的合作空间；尤其在经济与安全方面，合作可以带来亚太地区的稳定与繁荣。在此宣言中，我们探讨达成稳定与繁荣的可能方式，例如：建立经济特区、促进民间团体交流，以及完善多项制度设计，希望以此加深彼此理解、增强信心、追求繁荣。

完成这份涵盖众多领域的共同宣言诚为一项独特的成就，但我们仍希望能于此基础上继续努力，亦盼望他人能由此进一步追求建树。我们的目标除了阐明深度对话及通力合作蕴涵的价值，也欲强调达成共识将带来的长远益处。我们希冀描绘出一幅蓝图，促成未来更深更

¹“All history is contemporary history”，语出贝内德托·克罗齐（Benedetto Croce，1866年2月25日-1952年11月20日），意大利著名文艺批评家、历史学家、哲学家

广的努力，以达成区域的谅解与和平。读者可将此宣言视为一份国际合作的成果、一种对和平未来的设想，以及最重要地，一声对实际行动的呼吁。

7 两岸关系的社会认同

在台湾欲保有其作为独立实体的事实，而中国大陆向往完整与统一的条件下，如何可使双方减少偏见，加深理解？

此问题直接指向一关键事实，即两岸多年来已形成了迥异的集体身份认同。大陆方面对重获统一的希冀，对比台湾欲保有其独立政治实体的愿求，两者相互冲突，导致了双方身份认同的分歧。两种观念的对立，也显现于本次论坛代表对话的过程中。因此，我们建议双方在教育领域提供一系列涵括两岸历史观点的教材，期望联系起彼此相异的认同；此外，也可透过大众传媒来增进互相理解，或是创建两岸文化节庆来展示独特的文化认同，探索未来共存与凝聚之可能。

通过以上提议，我们希望重建一种两岸共享的身份认同，但同时也强调台湾民众对自身独特认同之珍视。成功实现上述策略，或可使双方更愿意中和各自对历史的不同认识，并建立互信。

7.1 通过教育建立对双方身份认同的认识

考虑到教育对塑造和影响集体思维的重要作用，我们相信它能够帮助中国大陆及台湾意识到彼此在身份认同上的共通与相异之处。

在为期一周的对话中，我们得以体验到以特定文化为背景的教育，对个人的历史感知和身份形成的深刻影响。因此，若欲加深我们对彼此身份认知的理解，从不同角度回溯历史显得十分重要。（见附录：“行走历史”实验）。

我们建议两岸学者合作撰写历史补充教材，在现有历史课本外，呈现对历史更多元的认识。此举目的在于：帮助两岸社会意识到彼此对历史有不同的经历与解读，并在此理解下，为将来关于和平共存的对话奠定基础。以 2002 年中-日-韩“补充教科书”合作项目为参考，我们能够明显地看到，从相异、甚至相冲突的角度来认识历史，更能加深彼此的理解。

我们同时提议创设及推广着眼于两岸关系的跨学科教育计划，通过两岸众多高校学生对各自历史见解与价值观的讨论与分享，加深彼此对身份差异的认识和理解。两岸来自历史学、社会学、政治科学及其它相关学科的顶尖学者应共同研拟课程安排，由此帮助学生更好地理解复杂的两岸关系。

双方的政府机关可以共同议定对上述项目的资金支援方案，包括对学生的奖学金和对参与学者的资助；而涉及此方案的相关资讯应确保公开。同时，该项目应保护两岸学者表达观点的自由，免受来自双方政府或主流民意的打压。

7.2 通过媒体传播减少对彼此的偏见和误解

两岸交往中，缺乏可靠资讯是对和解的重大阻碍。考虑到媒体对群体思维的影响，我们提倡两岸借助媒体之力减少偏见，增进理解。为了达成这一目标，我们建议成立一个新的大众传媒共同体，其传播的资讯应在两种价值观间达成平衡，即大陆对创造社会共同体的追求，

与台湾保持特殊身份认同的期望。来自两岸的媒体专业人士将通力合作，以确保媒体间不同观点及呈现手法的对等交流。希望这个新大众传媒共同体能向海峡两岸播送公正而真实的资讯与文艺节目。

有鉴于这个供两岸专家学者自由交流的公开平台所带来的长期收益，新传媒共同体将包含一个多方参与的电视网络，使不同文化脉络影响下的两岸专家学者，能交流碰撞各自的理念及想法，呈现多种观点与视角，借此促进两岸人民相互的尊重与理解。

我们同时提议推出一档联合制作的新闻节目，并由两岸记者共同担纲采编。他们应尊重而审慎地验证资讯并向大众播送，且提供客观而深入的分析。

我们建议新电视网络在两地播放对方的文艺娱乐节目，以及该网络制作的新节目。其内容可以介绍两岸一般家庭的日常生活，从而提供对彼此文化的真切观察，并提倡彼此对身份认同的理解尊重。

同时，应设立一个监督委员会，以确保新传媒共同体之公正。为了确保彼此身份认同的切实表达，该委员会应由两岸的专家和民众代表共同组成。另外，新传媒之运作经费应由双方共同贡献。它应将来自两岸官方机构、商业组织及公众个人的捐献，向大众保持公开透明，从而在观众间建立公信力。

7.3 通过文化交流接纳彼此的身份认同

在尊重大陆创造社会共同体的追求，及台湾保持特殊身份认同的期望下，我们倡议设立文化节，以励两岸人民对彼此身份认同进行讨论。通过分享和交流，民众不仅能够体会到彼此文化差异，更能够发掘其中蕴含的相同相通之处。

我们认为此类节庆应涵盖文化的诸多方面，而关于食物的分享能够有效地达到这一目的，因为食物以最轻松直接的方式，承载着多样的文化特征。因此“食物交流节”不仅能使两岸民众对双方的共同点有直接认识，更能鼓励彼此对不同身份特征的理解和尊重。类似活动已经举办数次，但规模受限。在现有的基础上，我们建议类似的“食物交流节”由两岸轮流承办，以提供更加自由的交流平台和更广泛的公众参与。

有鉴于文化身份认同具有随时间发展和变化的可能性，使两岸民众共同探讨彼此异同的持续对话是必要的。同时，各自的文化象征物，如官方歌曲、旗帜和语言，作为文化认同的重要体现，应得到尊重及保存。

8 两岸关系的政治层面

在确保两岸安全的前提下，如何满足中国大陆对管辖台湾的期望，同时维持台湾现有的政治自主及社会自由？

过去数十年来，沟通与理解的缺乏导致了台海关系的不稳定。中国大陆宣称台湾是其合法领土，并因此认为两岸统一攸关其核心利益——稳定与繁荣。故中国大陆认为任何寻求台湾法理独立的举动，都是对其核心利益的挑战。另一方面，台湾对更大自主性的寻求，源于其独特的历史经历，以及其费尽艰辛所争取到的民主价值。因此对台湾而言，自主与自由为其核心利益。

近年来两岸交流增长，台海问题和平解决的可能性也随之增加。综观当前局势，我们提出以下建议。它包含两个部分：建立互信机制以及可能的两岸政治架构。在第一个部分，我们提议建立较大规模的交流渠道，让两岸的行政人员，能参与双方互动。第二，随着双方信心的累积和理解的加深，两种可能的两岸政治架构值得进一步讨论。但在讨论这两个架构以前，两岸必须先订立一份互不侵犯协议，同时确保双方财政和货币体系的自主性，并且建立允许两岸政治协商深入讨论的机制。

8.1 建立互信以维持海峡两岸稳定

我们意识到两岸资深官员的互相理解及直接对话，是维持两岸稳定的关键因素。因此，我们建议设立非正式的交流渠道，例如举办“互动式冲突解决会谈”，让两岸资深官员以个人的身份参加，以实现开放而真诚的对话。这类讨论会将成为参与者共同讨论、分析和寻找两岸问题解决方案的良好平台。此外，我们也期望两岸能推行一个以政府官员为主的短期交流计划，让两岸官员交换彼此的政治见解。此计划旨在让参与者了解彼此的政治行为模式，并建立互信，奠定今后合作根基。

8.2 两岸治理的政治框架

我们承认两岸关系在政治层面处于僵局，但同时也表达我们商讨未来两岸政治架构的意愿。我们认为最佳的情况，是以下面两个条件为前提的讨论。

第一，我们提倡双方签订一份互不侵犯协议。第二，我们建议双方政府完成确保各自财政货币体系自主性的讨论。关于中国政府近期对民主化的推行，及由此所展现出的良善友好意图，来自台湾的代表们表示关注及嘉许，并期望这样的努力能够持续。

基于以上原则，我们尝试描绘出两种可能的两岸政治架构愿景。第一个愿景是建立一个独特的两岸政治架构，并从历史上邦联制的先行案例中寻求启发。双方在这一架构中都将保留完整的自治权。这一政治架构的基础是一份双方共同起草并通过的宪法。这部宪法的法律位阶高于双方的现行宪法，它将保证双方政府的完整自治权，并保证双方实际治理区域的和平与稳定。

当这种邦联系统发展稳定和成熟之后，双方可以考虑组建一种联邦制架构。在这个联邦制架构下，台湾将会成为其中的一个成员。身为这个联邦内的一个实体，台湾将拥有和其他成员同等的权利。我们理解这样一种联邦体制（比起邦联制）需要更多两岸之间的协调融合，因此，我们把它当作一个值得未来进一步思考及大胆探索的两岸政治架构。

9 两岸关系与美国

尽管各自对身份认同和国族利益有不同认识，美国、中国大陆及台湾可以如何强化三方关系，并透过经济与安全合作来维持亚太地区稳定？

最近几十年来，美国、中国大陆及台湾的关系好转，但三方的互疑依旧存在。两岸及中美关系因中国的和平崛起而获得新的契机；但美国的“重返亚洲”战略，以及台湾对更高度自治的追求，却又使此关系更加复杂化，衍生出一连串的挑战，导致了区域紧张及分歧。

尽管存在不同观点和不信任，三方在经济与安全领域上的合作空间仍然广阔。我们相信两岸经济合作能促进区域融合、东亚稳定和更友好的地区关系。此外，三方在制度建设层面也有合作空间。我们认为两岸及美国应就削减军备举行高阶对话，并在非军事领域如赈灾、人道主义援助等方面展开合作。最后，我们呼吁建立跨国智库以讨论两岸问题，增进三方互信。上述几方面的合作，能推动区域融合，维护亚太地区稳定和繁荣。

9.1 经济关系与平衡

亚太地区是一个高度融合的地区，是全球经济增长的引擎。推动全球经济进一步繁荣，维护亚太地区和平与持续稳定、提高福利水平，能为包括美国在内的相关经济体带来共同利益。

我们认为经济合作是推动各方经济繁荣的有效方法。通过兼顾各方、妥善管理的经济合作，台湾和中国大陆可以利用全球供应链、亚太地区的新兴市场，以及包括美国在内的成熟市场，来发展经济。此外，三方应推动亚太地区签署全方位贸易协定，以加强经彼此经贸联系。这些协议必须尊重和适应各方结构性差异。

例如，中国大陆和台湾可以分别利用他们在生产领域、技术和市场结构上的优势，来提高经济资源的分配和利用效率。我们提议两岸深化互补性合作，比如建立新的经济特区，将大陆的劳动力资源、充足资金，与台湾的先进技术相结合，以进一步吸引外来投资和交易。吸引大量国际投资到台湾和中国大陆，有助于丰富区域经济活动、多样化资金来源，实现独特、交融而平衡的发展，并朝着区域繁荣这一共同目标迈进。

我们视经济合作和平衡的区域融合为区域繁荣及稳定的基石。在推动此目标时，我们也要强调，需警惕不平衡贸易或单方过于依赖的现象。所以，经济政策需要寻求多样化，避免贸易上过度依赖或结构性的不平衡。

9.2 区域稳定与制度设计

鉴于亚太区域内各方的安全目标相互冲突，紧张局势经常升级，区域安全的制度设计刻不容缓。

我们理解两岸或更广范围的区域军备竞赛并非长久之道。为削弱军事化的趋势，各方领导层需厘清其安全需求、社会责任和规章条例，以防止紧张程度加深。我们提出的区域去军事化计划与中美两方特别有关，因为若欲和缓紧张局势，无可避免需减少两方的军事部署。上述步骤的实施，将展示各方对于建立信任的决心，并为进一步合作奠定基础。

为了降低改变现状将产生的风险，三方应该共同循序渐进地探索两岸去军事化进程的可能性。这一程序开始之前，各方应就各种可能有助于推动去军事化的情况和条件，进行开诚布公的讨论。在这一进程中，各方，特别是美中两方，应考虑联合军演的后勤安排。这些共同努力对于防范新兴安全威胁，如恐怖主义、海盗和环境公害都有效益。

我们倡议中国大陆、台湾和美国建立一个专门的论坛。此机制能够给予三方相关单位的官员，一个可以开诚布公讨论安全问题的空间。其余希望与中国大陆、台湾和美国达成安全共识的国家和地区，在合适的情况下可被邀请加入。至于是否逐步扩大论坛参与成员，需由三方共识决定。

9.3 透过非官方管道建立关系

顾虑到目前于三方间建立官方关系的实质困难，我们建议设立一系列替代途径，通过这些方式让三方可以直接交流并建立互信。这些非官方交流管道的参与者可包括公民社会、非政府组织、个人、商业团体、教育及研究机构。

此类替代途径能够促进城市间的合作。此三方的主要经济、文化重镇相互的合作伙伴关系，能推动彼此间多轨外交，有助于发展以人为本的三方关系。通过这些非官方交流管道，三方能就某些因缺乏官方交流而尚待解决的跨国挑战，如污染和环境变化等议题，展开主流对话。

亚太地区的长期不稳定，在一定程度上源于缺乏可靠的资讯。为了加强区域对政治、经济，和安全议题的分析能力，我们建议建立一个两岸智库，并由三方共同投入资金和人才。该智库的建立也需要其它利益攸关方的贡献，例如与地区相关的团体或专家个人的加入。作为受三方信任且提供高品质研究与对话的论坛，此智库应就两岸及亚太地区相关的议题，提供及时分析，并云集各方意见领袖，商讨因应挑战的共同解决之道。此外，该智库也将作为资讯汇集中心，为欲建立公众意识及对话管道的教育机构和媒体从业人员，提供创新途径。

10 结语

如何化解两岸僵局是亚太地区最重要而具挑战性的政治议题之一。中国大陆对恢复历史统一的希冀，与台湾对保持独特而独立的身份认同的愿望，构成了两岸政治困境中的核心冲突。在此宣言中，我们提出了一系列建议，期望通过沟通，建立对彼此心态上差异的理解，尽可能满足各方需求，最终构建区域之和平、稳定及繁荣。

我们提出了许多翔实具体的建议，从跨文化庆典、交换学生项目、财政货币体系安排，直到两岸和平协议。用于探索这些解决方案的合作与努力，则是出于我们对尊重人性，化解纠纷的夙愿。我们期待建立一个信任与友谊的基础，在此之上形成一套各方皆可接受的冲突解决方案。

本共同宣言无需成为海峡两岸问题之确定的解决方案，而是为了证明来自中国大陆、台湾，以及美国三方的参与者能透过对话达成合作，以满足各方需求。最终，我们希望我们的对话互动过程，能成为进一步解决问题的参考模式。虽然此宣言只是我们深入分析过往而得出的结果，但它同时代表我们对未来和平的愿景。

我们希望读者不仅将此宣言视为陆台美三方共识的展现，更重要的是，将其视为对行动的呼吁。我们相信，这份见证我们合力寻求解决方案过程的宣言，足以说明以果决行动化解两岸问题是可行的，但关键在于各方积极的承诺及参与。

Part III

共同宣言臺灣正體中文譯本

11 緒言

中國大陸長期以來希冀通過統一臺灣，維護其歷史領土完整。與此同時，臺灣民眾構建了獨特的國族認同，形成了獨有的民族性格，且認為與大陸的統一會讓自己喪失此民族性格。「一切歷史都是當代史」²，兩地各自經歷及書寫的歷史相互影響，並作用於當下。而由此引發的兩岸政治困局，至今未獲雙方皆可接受的解決方案。

於此背景下，作為第三方的美國，因與中國大陸及臺灣的關係，以及在海峽兩岸及亞太地區長期穩定發展中的收益，所持立場對兩岸關係有重要影響。此宣言記錄我們在「互動式衝突解決會談」(Interactive Conflict Resolution, ICR) 中，持續對話一週的結果。此過程中，來自各方關注兩岸議題的代表們相聚討論，共同分析衝突之源頭、探索可能的解決方案，並建立長久的友誼。

我們的團隊由關心兩岸議題的十五位青年學子組成，其中五人來自中國大陸，五人來自臺灣，五人來自美國。我們在充滿互動及體驗性的對話中共同探索，本著對各方參與者人性的同情及理解，最終提出一系列建議，希望它們有助於兩岸問題的解決。我們著重多視角的問題分析，試圖提煉出陸、臺、美三方，各自認為己方在兩岸衝突中受威脅的「人性基本需求」(Basic Human Needs)，並將這些看似無法兼容的需求，呈現在三個具有開放性及探索性的問題中，繼而在此基礎上尋求創新的解答。以下為我們對這三個「悖論問題」共同尋得的解答。惟須強調，這三個問題僅為激發我們思索的跳板，最後形成的回答其實已超出原本問題的範疇。此外，為使此宣言成為我們十五人之共識，我們不得不將某些缺乏一致認同，但具有進一步討論空間的想法暫且捨去。

本共同宣言從三個不同層面探討兩岸關係。一是文化與身份認同，包括中國大陸保持領土完整的夙願，及臺灣民眾對自身獨特身份的認同，及其作為獨立實體之狀態的高度珍視。在此章節，我們提出促進文化交流，強化官方合作等一系列建議，希望兩岸以求同存異的態度面對歷史遺產，架起連結兩方集體心態的橋樑。

第二個層面是政治與安全，它的主要矛盾源於大陸管治臺灣的強烈意願，以及臺灣保有其政治自治的希求。在此章節，我們將說明如何藉由增進雙方溝通、確保財政自主及達成政治協議的方式，消弭對立，培養互信。

第三個層面將兩岸衝突視為中國大陸、臺灣，美國三方共同面對的挑戰。儘管兩岸對現狀充滿疑慮，我們相信雙方仍有廣闊的合作空間；尤其在經濟與安全方面，合作可以帶來亞太地區的穩定與繁榮。在此報告書中，我們探討達成穩定與繁榮的可能方式，例如：建立經濟特區、促進民間團體交流，以及完善多項制度設計，希望以此加深彼此理解、增強信心、追求繁榮。

完成這份涵蓋眾多領域的共同宣言誠為一項獨特的成就，但我們仍希望能於此基礎上繼續努力，亦盼望他人能由此進一步追求建樹。我們的目標除了闡明深度對話及通力合作蘊涵

²“All history is contemporary history”，語出貝內德托·克羅齊 (Benedetto Croce, 1866 年 2 月 25 日- 1952 年 11 月 20 日)，義大利著名文藝批評家、歷史學家、哲學家。

的價值，也欲強調達成共識將帶來的長遠益處。我們希冀描繪出一幅藍圖，促成未來更深更廣的努力，以達成區域的諒解與和平。讀者可將此宣言視為一份國際合作的成果、一種對和平未來的設想，以及最重要地，一聲對實際行動的呼籲。

12 兩岸關係的社會認同

在臺灣欲保有其作為獨立實體的事實，而中國大陸嚮往完整與統一的條件下，如何可使雙方減少偏見，加深理解？

此問題直接指向一關鍵事實，即兩岸多年來已形成了迥異的集體身份認同。大陸方面對重獲統一的希冀，對比臺灣欲保有其獨立政治實體的願求，兩者相互衝突，導致了雙方身份認同的分歧。兩種觀念的對立，也顯現於本次論壇代表對話的過程中。因此，我們建議雙方在教育領域提供一系列涵括兩岸歷史觀點的教材，期望聯繫起彼此相異的認同；此外，也可透過大眾傳媒來增進互相理解，或是創建兩岸文化節慶來展示獨特的文化認同，探索未來共存與凝聚之可能。

通過以上提議，我們希望重建一種兩岸共享的身份認同，但同時也強調臺灣民眾對自身獨特認同之珍視。成功實現上述策略，或可使雙方更願意中和各自對歷史的不同認識，並建立互信。

12.1 通過教育建立對雙方身份認同的認識

考慮到教育對塑造和影響集體思維的重要作用，我們相信它能夠幫助中國大陸及臺灣意識到彼此在身份認同上的共通與相異之處。

在為期一週的對話中，我們得以體驗到以特定文化為背景的教育，對個人的歷史感知和身份形成的深刻影響。因此，若欲加深我們對彼此身份認知的理解，從不同角度回溯歷史顯得十分重要。（見附錄：「行走歷史」實驗）。

我們建議兩岸學者合作撰寫歷史補充教材，在現有歷史課本外，呈現對歷史更多元的認識。此舉目的在於：幫助兩岸社會意識到彼此對歷史有不同的經歷與解讀，並在此理解下，為將來關於和平共存的對話奠定基礎。以 2002 年中-日-韓「補充教科書」合作項目為參考，我們能夠明顯地看到，從相異、甚至相衝突的角度來認識歷史，更能加深彼此的理解。

我們同時提議創設及推廣著眼於兩岸關係的跨學科教育計劃，通過兩岸眾多高校學生對各自歷史見解與價值觀的討論與分享，加深彼此對身份差異的認識和理解。兩岸來自歷史學、社會學、政治科學及其它相關學科的頂尖學者應共同研擬課程安排，由此幫助學生更好地理解複雜的兩岸關係。

雙方的政府機關可以共同議定對上述項目的資金支援方案，包括對學生的獎學金和對參與學者的資助；而涉及此方案的相關資訊應確保公開。同時，該項目應保護兩岸學者表達觀點的自由，免受來自雙方政府或主流民意的打壓。

12.2 通過媒體傳播減少對彼此的偏見和誤解

兩岸交往中，缺乏可靠資訊是對和解的重大阻礙。考慮到媒體對群體思維的影響，我們提倡兩岸藉助媒體之力減少偏見，增進理解。為了達成這一目標，我們建議成立一個新的大

眾傳媒共同體，其傳播的資訊應在兩種價值觀間達成平衡，即大陸對創造社會共同體的追求，與臺灣保持特殊身份認同的期望。來自兩岸的媒體專業人士將通力合作，以確保媒體間不同觀點及呈現手法的對等交流。希望這個新大眾傳媒共同體能向海峽兩岸播送公正而真實的資訊與文藝節目。

有鑑於這個供兩岸專家學者自由交流的公開平臺所帶來的長期收益，新傳媒共同體將包含一個多方參與的電視網路，使不同文化脈絡影響下的兩岸專家學者，能交流碰撞各自的理念及想法，呈現多種觀點與視角，藉此促進兩岸人民相互的尊重與理解。

我們同時提議推出一檔聯合製作的新聞節目，並由兩岸記者共同擔綱採編。他們應尊重而審慎地驗證資訊並向大眾播送，且提供客觀而深入的分析。

我們建議新電視網路在兩地播放對方的文藝娛樂節目，以及該網路製作的新節目。其內容可以介紹兩岸一般家庭的日常生活，從而提供對彼此文化的真切觀察，並提倡彼此對身份認同的理解尊重。

同時，應設立一個監督委員會，以確保新傳媒共同體之公正。為了確保彼此身份認同的切實表達，該委員會應由兩岸的專家和民眾代表共同組成。另外，新傳媒之運作經費應由雙方共同貢獻。它應將來自兩岸官方機構、商業組織及公眾個人的捐獻，向大眾保持公開透明，從而在觀眾間建立公信力。

12.3 通過文化交流接納彼此的身份認同

在尊重大陸創造社會共同體的追求，及臺灣保持特殊身份認同的期望下，我們倡議設立文化節，以勵兩岸人民對彼此身份認同進行討論。通過分享和交流，民眾不僅能夠體會到彼此文化差異，更能夠發掘其中蘊含的相同相通之處。

我們認為此類節慶應涵蓋文化的諸多方面，而關於食物的分享能夠有效地達到這一目的，因為食物以最輕鬆直接的方式，承載著多樣的文化特徵。因此「食物交流節」不僅能使兩岸民眾對雙方的共同點有直接認識，更能鼓勵彼此對不同身份特徵的理解和尊重。類似活動已經舉辦數次，但規模受限。在現有的基礎上，我們建議類似的「食物交流節」由兩岸輪流承辦，以提供更加自由的交流平臺和更廣泛的公眾參與。

有鑑於文化身份認同具有隨時間發展和變化的可能性，使兩岸民眾共同探討彼此異同的持續對話是必要的。同時，各自的文化象徵物，如官方歌曲、旗幟和語言，作為文化認同的重要體現，應得到尊重及保存。

13 兩岸關係的政治層面

在確保兩岸安全的前提下，如何滿足中國大陸對管轄臺灣的期望，同時維持臺灣現有的政治自主及社會自由？

過去數十年來，溝通與理解的缺乏導致了臺海關係的不穩定。中國大陸宣稱臺灣是其合法領土，並因此認為兩岸統一攸關其核心利益——穩定與繁榮。故中國大陸認為任何尋求臺灣法理獨立的舉動，都是對其核心利益的挑戰。另一方面，臺灣對更大自主性的尋求，源於其獨特的歷史經歷，以及其費盡艱辛所爭取到的民主價值。因此對臺灣而言，自主與自由為其核心利益。

近年來兩岸交流增長，臺海問題和平解決的可能性也隨之增加。綜觀當前局勢，我們提出以下建議。它包含兩個部分：建立互信機制以及可能的兩岸政治架構。在第一個部分，我們提議建立較大規模的交流渠道，讓兩岸的行政人員，能參與雙方互動。第二，隨著雙方信心的累積和理解的加深，兩種可能的兩岸政治架構值得進一步討論。但在討論這兩個架構以前，兩岸必須先訂立一份互不侵犯協議，同時確保雙方財政和貨幣體系的自主性，並且建立允許兩岸政治協商深入討論的機制。

13.1 建立互信以維持海峽兩岸穩定

我們意識到兩岸資深官員的互相理解及直接對話，是維持兩岸穩定的關鍵因素。因此，我們建議設立非正式的交流渠道，例如舉辦「互動式衝突解決會談」，讓兩岸資深官員以個人的身份參加，以實現開放而真誠的對話。這類討論會將成為參與者共同討論、分析和尋找兩岸問題解決方案的良好平臺。此外，我們也期望兩岸能推行一個以政府官員為主的短期交流計劃，讓兩岸官員交換彼此的政治見解。此計劃旨在讓參與者了解彼此的政治行為模式，並建立互信，奠定今後合作根基。

13.2 兩岸治理的政治框架

我們承認兩岸關係在政治層面處於僵局，但同時也表達我們商討未來兩岸政治架構的意願。我們認為最佳的情況，是以下面兩個條件為前提的討論。

第一，我們提倡雙方簽訂一份互不侵犯協議。第二，我們建議雙方政府完成確保各自財政貨幣體系自主性的討論。關於中國政府近期對民主化的推行，及由此所展現出的良善友好意圖，來自台灣的代表們表示關注及嘉許，並期望這樣的努力能夠持續。

基於以上原則，我們嘗試描繪出兩種可能的兩岸政治架構願景。第一個願景是建立一個獨特的兩岸政治架構，並從歷史上邦聯制的先行案例中尋求啟發。雙方在這一架構中都將保留完整的自治權。這一政治架構的基礎是一份雙方共同起草並通過的憲法。這部憲法的法律位階高於雙方的現行憲法，它將保證雙方政府的完整自治權，並保證雙方實際治理區域的和平與穩定。

當這種邦聯系統發展穩定和成熟之後，雙方可以考慮組建一種聯邦制架構。在這個聯邦制架構下，臺灣將會成為其中的一個成員。身為這個聯邦內的一個實體，臺灣將擁有和其他成員同等的權利。我們理解這樣一種聯邦體制（比起邦聯制）需要更多兩岸之間的協調融合，因此，我們把它當作一個值得未來進一步思考及大膽探索的兩岸政治架構。

14 兩岸關係與美國

儘管各自對身份認同和國族利益有不同認識，美國、中國大陸及臺灣可以如何強化三方關係，並透過經濟與安全合作來維持亞太地區穩定？

最近幾十年來，美國、中國大陸及臺灣的關係好轉，但三方的互疑依舊存在。兩岸及中美關係因中國的和平崛起而獲得新的契機；但美國的「重返亞洲」戰略，以及臺灣對更高度自治的追求，卻又使此關係更加複雜化，衍生出一連串的挑战，導致了區域緊張及分歧。

儘管存在不同觀點和不信任，三方在經濟與安全領域上的合作空間仍然廣闊。我們相信兩岸經濟合作能促進區域融合、東亞穩定和更友好的地區關係。此外，三方在制度建設層面也有合作空間。我們認為兩岸及美國應就削減軍備舉行高階對話，並在非軍事領域如賑災、人道主義援助等方面展開合作。最後，我們呼籲建立跨國智庫以討論兩岸問題，增進三方互信。上述幾方面的合作，能推動區域融合，維護亞太地區穩定和繁榮。

14.1 經濟關係與平衡

亞太地區是一個高度融合的地區，是全球經濟增長的引擎。推動全球經濟進一步繁榮，維護亞太地區和平與持續穩定、提高福利水平，能為包括美國在內的相關經濟體帶來共同利益。

我們認為經濟合作是推動各方經濟繁榮的有效方法。通過兼顧各方、妥善管理的經濟合作，臺灣和中國大陸可以利用全球供應鏈、亞太地區的新興市場，以及包括美國在內的成熟市場，來發展經濟。此外，三方應推動亞太地區簽署全方位貿易協定，以加強經彼此經貿聯繫。這些協議必須尊重和適應各方結構性差異。

例如，中國大陸和臺灣可以分別利用他們在生產領域、技術和市場結構上的優勢，來提高經濟資源的分配和利用效率。我們提議兩岸深化互補性合作，比如建立新的經濟特區，將大陸的勞動力資源、充足資金，與臺灣的先進技術相結合，以進一步吸引外來投資和交易。吸引大量國際投資到臺灣和中國大陸，有助於豐富區域經濟活動、多樣化資金來源，實現獨特、交融而平衡的發展，並朝著區域繁榮這一共同目標邁進。

我們視經濟合作和平衡的區域融合為區域繁榮及穩定的基石。在推動此目標時，我們也要強調，需警惕不平衡貿易或單方過於依賴的現象。所以，經濟政策需要尋求多樣化，避免貿易上過度依賴或結構性的不平衡。

14.2 區域穩定與制度設計

鑑於亞太區域內各方的安全目標相互衝突，緊張局勢經常升級，區域安全的制度設計刻不容緩。

我們理解兩岸或更廣範圍的區域軍備競賽並非長久之道。為削弱軍事化的趨勢，各方領導層需釐清其安全需求、社會責任和規章條例，以防止緊張程度加深。我們提出的區域去軍事化計畫與中美兩方特別有關，因為若欲和緩緊張局勢，無可避免需減少兩方的軍事部署。上述步驟的實施，將展示各方對於建立信任的決心，並為進一步合作奠定基礎。

為了降低改變現狀將產生的風險，三方應該共同循序漸進地探索兩岸去軍事化進程的可能性。這一程序開始之前，各方應就各種可能有助於推動去軍事化的情況和條件，進行開誠佈公的討論。在這一進程中，各方，特別是美中兩方，應考慮聯合軍演的後勤安排。這些共同努力對於防範新興安全威脅，如恐怖主義、海盜和環境公害都有效益。

我們倡議中國大陸、臺灣和美國建立一個專門的論壇。此機制能夠給予三方相關單位的官員，一個可以開誠佈公討論安全問題的空間。其餘希望與中國大陸、臺灣和美國達成安全共識的國家和地區，在合適的情況下可被邀請加入。至於是否逐步擴大論壇參與成員，需由三方共識決定。

14.3 透過非官方管道建立關係

顧慮到目前於三方間建立官方關係的實質困難，我們建議設立一系列替代途徑，通過這些方式讓三方可以直接交流並建立互信。這些非官方交流管道的參與者可包括公民社會、非政府組織、個人、商業團體、教育及研究機構。

此類替代途徑能夠促進城市間的合作。此三方的主要經濟、文化重鎮相互的合作夥伴關係，能推動彼此間多軌外交，有助於發展以人為本的三方關係。通過這些非官方交流管道，三方能就某些因缺乏官方交流而尚待解決的跨國挑戰，如汙染和環境變化等議題，展開主流對話。

亞太地區的長期不穩定，在一定程度上源於缺乏可靠的資訊。為了加強區域對政治、經濟，和安全議題的分析能力，我們建議建立一個兩岸智庫，並由三方共同投入資金和人才。該智庫的建立也需要其它利益攸關方的貢獻，例如與地區相關的團體或專家個人的加入。作為受三方信任且提供高品質研究與對話的論壇，此智庫應就兩岸及亞太地區相關的議題，提供及時分析，並雲集各方意見領袖，商討因應挑戰的共同解決之道。此外，該智庫也將作為資訊匯集中心，為欲建立公眾意識及對話管道的教育機構和媒體從業人員，提供創新途徑。

15 結語

如何化解兩岸僵局是亞太地區最重要而具挑戰性的政治議題之一。中國大陸對恢復歷史統一的希冀，與臺灣對保持獨特而獨立的身份認同的願望，構成了兩岸政治困境中的核心衝突。在此宣言中，我們提出了一系列建議，期望通過溝通，建立對彼此心態上差異的理解，儘可能滿足各方需求，最終構建區域之和平、穩定及繁榮。

我們提出了許多翔實具體的建議，從跨文化慶典、交換學生項目、財政貨幣體系安排，直到兩岸和平協議。用於探索這些解決方案的合作與努力，則是出於我們對尊重人性，化解糾紛的夙願。我們期待建立一個信任與友誼的基礎，在此之上形成一套各方皆可接受的衝突解決方案。

本共同宣言無需成為海峽兩岸問題之確定的解決方案，而是為了證明來自中國大陸、臺灣，以及美國三方的參與者能透過對話達成合作，以滿足各方需求。最終，我們希望我們的對話互動過程，能成為進一步解決問題的參考模式。雖然此宣言只是我們深入分析過往而得出的結果，但它同時代表我們對未來和平的願景。

我們希望讀者不僅將此宣言視為陸臺美三方共識的展現，更重要的是，將其視為對行動的呼籲。我們相信，這份見證我們合力尋求解決方案過程的宣言，足以說明以果決行動化解兩岸問題是可行的，但關鍵在於各方積極的承諾及參與。

Part IV

Appendix: Comparative Timelines of Cross-Strait Relations

The Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) dialogue in which we, as 15 delegates, were engaged consisted of a series of experiential exercises for joint conflict analysis. One of such exercises was a “walk through history,” an interactive method of group-based learning about conflict history. This exercise invited each of the three delegations to first meet among themselves to identify nine historical events that most decisively shaped the nature of the conflict across the Taiwan Strait, and then compared the three timelines to appreciate disparate perspectives on its history. The following table summarizes the three timelines formulated separately by the three delegations:

Mainland China	Taiwan	United States
		Opium Wars(1839-42, 1856-60)
		World War II(1939-45)
Treaty of Shimonoseki(1895)	Treaty of Shimonoseki(1895)	
Cairo Declaration(1943)		
Chinese Civil War(1945)		
	228 Event(1947)	
	KMT retreat to Taiwan(1949)	
	Korean War(1950)	
First Taiwan Strait Crisis(1954-55)		
	R.O.C leaves the United Nations(1971)	
Nixon's visit(1972)		
	Taiwan Relations Act(1979)	Taiwan Relations Act(1979)
		Tian'anmen crackdown(1989)
		End of Cold War(1991)
The 1992 Consensus(1992)		George H. Bush F-14 Sales to Taiwan(1992)
		MFN Status (Most Favored Nation) to China disputed(1993)
Taiwan Strait Crisis(1995-96)		Taiwan Strait Missile crisis(1995)
	Lee Teng-Hui elected president of the R.O.C(1996)	
Chen Shui-Bian elected president of the R.O.C(2000)		
	Ma Ying-Jeou elected president of the R.O.C(2008)	Financial crisis(2008)
ECFA(Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement)(2010)		
	Sunflower protest movement(2014)	